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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF 
JUDICIAL COUNCILS IN THE REFORM 
OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 
BETWEEN KENYA AND ENGLAND 
NJERI THUKU 1 
I. INTRODUCTION 
…The Council has, however, learnt with profound shock that 
William Tuiyott, who has been serving as a Chief Magistrate in 
Kisii, has also been appointed judge…Mr. Tuiyott has all the 
qualities that render a person unfit for appointment to a judicial 
office…Mr. Tuiyott’s appointment as judge is a significant step 
in the wrong direction in the administration of justice in Kenya. 
Mr. Tuiyott’s rise as a magistrate is, by itself the subject of 
considerable interest. Mr. Tuiyott, who has no formal training in 
the law, served as an interpreter in the African Native Courts 
until these courts were abolished in 1967…Between 1993 and 
1994, Mr. Tuiyott had an accelerated promotion: within one year 
he was promoted to Principal Magistrate, then to Senior 
Principal Magistrate and finally to Chief Magistrate, the highest 
rank in the magistracy. His performance, like his promotion, has 
been most questionable…Mr. Tuiyott’s contribution to the 
  
 1. Magistrate, Njeri Thuku Kenyan Judiciary. The opinions expressed in this paper are the 
views of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views or opinions of the Kenya Government or 
of the Kenyan Judiciary. All statements and information used in this paper are drawn from the public 
record. I would like to thank Prof. Okeke and Prof. Hamed Adib Natanzi for their guidance and 
feedback in the writing of this paper. 
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administration of justice, is to say the least nil. His elevation to 
high judicial office is an affront to honesty and hard work.2 
This is the reaction of the chairperson of the Law Society of Kenya 
(hereinafter "LSK") when Judge Tuiyott was appointed to the Kenyan 
Bench as a judge in 2000 by President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi. The 
LSK is the local Bar Association in Kenya that all lawyers admitted to 
the Bar join; it has membership nationwide.3 The Council he refers to is 
the leadership of the LSK comprised of the Chairperson, Vice-
Chairperson and other members.4  The outrage expressed by the LSK 
chairperson reflects what civil society and activist groups felt at the time.   
There is much interest globally in how judicial officers are selected 
because justice is a central pillar in every country. In this paper, I use the 
term "judicial officers" to refer to both judges and magistrates. Different 
methods are used by different countries to select judges, but the goal, 
regardless of the method, is to have judges and magistrates who can 
carry out their duties well. The general public must also have faith in the 
justice system because, if they do not, chaos and anarchy will reign as 
people take the law into their hands and resort to street justice. 
In this paper, I focus on the selection of judicial officers using judicial 
commissions. These judicial commissions are also referred to as “judicial 
councils” or “merit commissions,” so for the purposes of this study, these 
three terms are synonymous. This paper focuses on Kenya and England 
because they have taken similar paths to judicial reform. For example, 
they both added an extra tier to the hierarchical structure and therefore 
both have a Supreme Court. They both have robust judicial commissions 
that have changed the selection of judicial officers. However, the judicial 
commission in Kenya, known as the Judicial Service Commission 
(hereinafter “JSC”) selects both magistrates and judges who must have 
had legal training and passed the Kenyan Bar exam. The judicial 
commission in England, referred to as the Judicial Appointments 
Commission (hereinafter “JAC”), only selects judges. Though Kenya is a 
former British colony and part of the Commonwealth, it did not 
transplant the JAC from England in its reforms. In fact, Kenya’s JSC pre-
dates the JAC in England but was re-constituted and strengthened in 
  
 2. LSK reacts to Tuiyott’s Appointment, THE LAWYER, July 2000, at 8-9. See also KOIGI WA 
WAMWERE, JUSTICE ON TRIAL: THE KOIGI CASE 42-70 (Views Media 1997). 
 3. About LSK,  http://www.lsk.or.ke/index.php/about-lsk (last visited March 22, 2013). 
 4. Judges Appointed, THE LAWYER, July 2000, at 3. The opening line stated, “On  2nd June, 
2000 President Moi appointed three more judges to the  High Court of Kenya.  They are Lady 
Justice Rawal, Justices Hewett and Tuiyott.” See also Our Organisational Structure, 
http://www.lsk.or.ke/index.php/our-organisational-structure (last visited April 19, 2013). 
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2010. Nevertheless, the JSC has a slight resemblance to the JAC. These 
two countries also demonstrate the success of judicial councils in both a 
developed and stable democracy as well as in a developing and fragile 
democracy. 
The purpose of this study is to compare the contributions to judicial 
reforms that both judicial commissions have made in their respective 
countries. The JSC in Kenya has been functioning for two years, having 
officially started its duties in February 2011.  Drawing on lessons from 
the JAC, the JSC’s performance in its first two years, and lessons from 
judicial councils globally, I make recommendations that, if implemented, 
will strengthen the JSC. 
By undertaking this analysis, I am guided by Canadian Professor 
Lorraine Weinrib, who writes, “[T]he relationship between the nature 
and quality of adjudication and the design of judicial appointment 
powers is, surprisingly, a relatively un-studied topic.”5 If the opening 
account of Judge Tuyiott’s appointment in Kenya is anything to go by, 
then Professor Weinrib’s assessment holds merit. How judges are chosen 
reflects not just their decisions, but also their conduct on the Bench. 
Public perception of the judicial system and whether the public 
population feels they will get justice when they come to court is a matter 
for consideration in the selection of judges. 
Professor Carl Baar, also from Canada, opines, “Comparative study, like 
a liberal education, is always good for you. It is supposed to broaden 
your perspective by helping you understand how others think about the 
world and operate within the worlds they have created in the past or are 
creating for the future.”6 He cautions, however, that a comparative study 
can narrow one’s view into traditional frameworks and draw attention 
away from other factors that are significant when making the 
comparison.7 While the substance of this paper is a comparative study, I 
have taken Carl Baar’s advice to steer clear of superficial comparisons. 
Instead, I look critically at the distinctive characteristics of the judicial 
commissions in both Kenya and England from a historical perspective, 
considering how the judicial commission operates now and the results of 
its work on the Bench in both countries. 
  
 5. Lorraine Eisenstate Weinrib, Appointing Judges To The Supreme Court Of Canada In The 
Charter Era: A Study In Institutional Function And Design, in APPOINTING JUDGES: PHILOSOPHY, 
POLITICS, AND PRACTICE, 109, 109 (Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1991). 
 6. Carl Baar, Comparative Perspectives on Judicial Selection Processes, in APPOINTING 
JUDGES: PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND PRACTICE, 143, 143 (Ontario Law Reform Commission, 
1991). 
 7. Id. at 144. 
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In order to appreciate the function of judicial commissions and the key 
role played in judicial appointments in Kenya as well as in England, it is 
important to have an understanding of its definition.  Professors Nuno 
Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg define judicial councils as “an international 
‘best practice’ designed to help ensure judicial independence and 
external accountability.”8 They hold the view that the makeup of judicial 
councils is primarily to shield the selection of judges from the politics 
involved, while at the same time instilling a measure of accountability.9 
Professor John O. Haley makes the same point in his study of the 
formation of judicial councils in Latin America, which were introduced 
as part of reforms. His position is that minimizing the political influence 
in systems often results from the reform of judicial councils – where the 
presidents appoints judges, citing the example of the appointment of 
federal judges in the United States.10 Francois du Bois, while referring to 
the JSC in South Africa, complements this definition by describing a 
judicial commission as a mixed body that can both decide and 
recommend. Du Bois’ view is that a judicial commission achieves the 
balance between independence and accountability.11 
In 1946, France was the first to have a body like a judicial commission 
that addressed the selection of judges and magistrates – called the 
Conseil Superior de la Magistrature.12 In 1958, Italy was the next 
country to have an organ similar to a judicial council, named the 
Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura.13 It is fascinating to note that 
these early developments took place in civil law countries, yet in the 
twenty-first century, the use of judicial councils is accepted in both civil 
and common law countries.14 The fascination arises because it 
demystifies a notion that judicial councils are a preserve of common law 
countries and because they are a common feature in countries that were 
former British colonies. Basically, Britain had a constitutional template 
that was used for almost every country in Africa that agitated for 
independence. Interestingly, this template had the requirement for a 
judicial council.  
  
 8. Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding The Guardians: Judicial Councils And 
Judicial Independence, 57 AMJCL 103, 103-104(2009). 
 9. Id, at 106. 
 10. John O. Haley, Judicial Reform: Conflicting Aims and Imperfect Models, 5 WAUGSLR 
81, 86 (2006). 
 11. François du Bois, Judicial Selection in post-Apartheid South Africa, in APPOINTING 
JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, 280, 285, (Kate Malleson & Peter H. Russell eds., 2006), 
285.  
 12. Haley, supra note 10.  See also Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 8. 
 13. Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 107. 
 14. Owen M. Fiss, The Right Degree of Independence, in TRANSITION TO DEMOCRACY IN 
LATIN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY, (Irwin Stotzky ed.) 55, 56 (1993). 
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Judicial councils are also found in developing as well as developed 
countries, though their composition and mandate differ from one country 
to another.15 It is significant to find judicial councils in both developed 
and developing countries because it shows that judiciaries in these 
countries face similar challenges; they are not necessarily worse in a 
developing country in comparison with a developed country. This may 
make it seem as though every country should aim to establish a judicial 
council as a method of selecting judges, but a judicial council may not be 
appropriate for every unique legal system of every country. In other 
words, different government structures appeal to different people.16 
Accountability and independence should be the ultimate goals when 
selecting judicial officers, whatever that method of selection may be.  
Chapter 1 gives the historical background of how judicial officers were 
selected in Kenya from the time of British colonization, beginning in 
1895, until independence in 1963. Chapter 1 also examines the historical 
background of the development of judges in England before shifting to 
the Lord Chancellor’s central role in the appointment of judges. The 
Constitutional Reform Act of 2005 reformed that role, which reduced his 
influence in the selection of judges. 
Chapter 2 discusses the factors that triggered changes to the systems of 
judicial appointment in both countries-Kenya and England. The 
approaches differ; in Kenya, the reform of judicial appointments had 
been discussed by the public and especially non-profit organizations, so 
public opinion supported this change.17 In England, however, the public 
was not fully prepared for the changes and initially resisted having a 
judicial commission. 
Chapter 3 looks in depth at the pre-2010 JSC and the post-2010 JSC in 
Kenya. The division is the promulgation of a new Constitution on August 
27, 2010 after a referendum. This Constitution brought fundamental 
changes to the Judiciary and the JSC.18 A similar change took place in 
England and Wales when the Constitutional Reform Act, 2005, which 
  
 15. Kate Malleson, Introduction, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, 
(Kate Malleson & Peter Russell eds.) 3, 7, (2006). 
 16. Definition of different in Oxford Dictionaries (British & World English) 
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/different?q=different+strokes+for+different+folks#different
__4 (last visited March 23, 2013).  
 17. Strengthening Judicial Reforms in Kenya Volume III: The Public’s Perception and 
Proposals on the Judiciary in the New Constitution, http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNACW006.pdf.  
 18. Editorial, Promulgation Marks Beginning of Constitutionalism, KENYAN WOMAN, Sept. 
2010, at 1, http://www.awcfs.org/dmdocuments/KenyanWoman/Kenyan%20Woman%20009.pdf.  
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contains the framework for the JAC, became law.19 I also explore the 
JAC’s composition along with the changes it brought to the Bench. 
In chapter 4, I consider other methods of selecting judges that are used in 
other jurisdictions that yield results surprisingly similar to what judicial 
councils achieve. I consider judges choosing judges, appointments by 
election, executive appointments of judges, and legislative appointments. 
For each of these methods, I focus on a specific country to demonstrate 
that on each continent, in both civil and common law countries, there are 
many lessons to learn. Chapter 5 highlights some recommendations 
primarily for the JSC in Kenya, which is in its formative years but also 
for any other judicial commission that wants to strengthen its 
mechanisms. Finally, in Chapter 6, I present closing thoughts in my 
conclusion. 
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF BOTH KENYA AND 
ENGLAND 
A. KENYA: 1884 TO 1963 
The history of Kenya, according to Westerners, began after the Berlin 
Conference in 1884-1885, when the partition of Africa by European 
powers took place.20 Borders that were drawn at the time defined the 
countries in Africa as they exist even today.21 Inside these borders lived 
different communities that, for generations prior to the arrival of 
Europeans, had devised a way of resolving disputes.22 However, when 
the British arrived, they brought their own methods of government, 
including a judicial system.23 In modern parlance, this is known as a 
transplant.24 The new judicial system that was imposed on the people of 
  
 19. Constitutional Reform, http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/about-the-judiciary/introduction-to-
justice-system/constitutional-reform (last visited March 23, 2013). 
 20. George N. Njenga, A Synopsis of the History of Kenya before Colonisation, 22 (2010), 
http://www.digital.library.strathmore.edu/xmlui/bitstream/handle/123456789/1167/History%20of%2
0Kenya%20-%20GN.pdf.   
 21. Id. at 4. 
 22. See Sarah Kinyanjui,  Restorative Justice in Traditional Pre-Colonial Criminal Justice 
Systems in Kenya, 10 TRIBAL L. REV 1 (2009-2010), http://tlj.unm.edu/volumes/vol10/Kinyanjui.pdf.  
 23. SIR FRED PHILLIPS, CVO, QC, THE MODERN JUDICIARY: CHALLENGES, STRESSES, AND 
STRAINS 1-6, (Wildy, Simmonds & Hill Publishing 2010). At page 3, Sir Phillips, expounding on 
how the laws were devised for the British colonies, explains, “The laws on the matter were normally 
set out in imperial and local statutes handed down by the British Government; and these laws made 
provision for the hierarchy of the courts to be set up and for judges that would man them.” 
 24. LEONARD C. KERCHER, THE KENYA LEGAL SYSTEM: PAST, PRESENT, AND PROSPECT,4 
(University Press of America 1981). At page 4, writing about the colonial criminal justice system but 
it applies to the whole process, Kercher states, “This was essentially a cultural transplant alien to the 
African mind and experience prior to the colonial presence, and was superimposed upon the 
informal, conciliatory system of controls and sanctions indigenous in most pre-colonial African 
societies.” See also Weinrib, supra note 5, at 112. She writes, “The appointment process for the 
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Kenya allowed them to keep their own judicial system, which the British 
labeled ‘native courts,’ using a system known as ‘indirect rule’. Leonard 
Kercher explains indirect rule as “utilizing where feasible…the 
traditional system of indigenous courts (variously referred to as “native,” 
“African” or “local” courts).”25 
The history of the Kenyan Judiciary as it exists today can be traced to 
1895, when Kenya became a British Protectorate.26 Judge Jackton 
Ojwang’, a Kenyan professor who joined the Bench and is now a 
Supreme Court judge explains, “Kenya’s judicial experience in the 
colonial days started with a pluralistic court system, with separate 
arrangements for Africans, Muslims and Europeans.”27 He writes that the 
Governor, who ruled over the colony, appointed judges on behalf of the 
Crown and that these judges derived their security of tenure from 
Britain.28 Thus, the colonizing country had a strong influence on how the 
governing institutions were established on the colony.29 In 1920, Kenya 
officially became a colony and, to assist them, the British used the laws 
they had brought from Great Britain to India and finally took these same 
laws to Kenya.30 These Indian laws were transplanted en masse with 
minimal changes; for example, the British would substitute the word 
“India” for “Kenya.”31 With regard to the legal system, the British set up 
in Kenya the same courts that existed in Great Britain in the late 
nineteenth century and early twentieth century.32 
  
Supreme Court of Canada derives from the British system. Unfortunately, in its transplantation to 
Canada the procedure appears to have lost its institutional strengths.” 
 25. KERCHER, supra note 24, at 5.See also Weinrib, supra note 5, at 112.The author’s 
sentiments that questions the success of transplantation of the British legal system to Canada reflect 
the situation in Kenya as well. 
 26. KERCHER, SUPRA note 24, at 10. See also Define Protectorate at Dictionary.com, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/protectorate (last visited March 25, 2013). A protectorate is a 
state or territory that is partly protected or controlled by a stronger state.  
 27. Jackton Ojwang’, Government and Constitutional Development in Kenya, 1895-1995, in 
KENYA: THE MAKING OF A NATION: A HUNDRED YEARS OF KENYA’S HISTORY, 1895-1995, 148, 
156 (Bethwell Ogot & W. Ochieng eds., 2000). 
 28. Id. at 156. 
 29. See generally MARTIN J. WIENER, AN EMPIRE ON TRIAL: RACE, MURDER, AND JUSTICE 
UNDER BRITISH RULE 1870-1935 193-221, (Cambridge University Press, 2009). 
 30. Id. at 200. Kenya was initially called East Africa Protectorate, but this name later changed 
to Kenya. See also History of Kenya, http://www.historyworld.net/wrldhis/ 
PlainTextHistories.asp?historyid=ad21 (last visited March 25, 2013).  
 31. Mathieu Deflem, Law Enforcement in British Colonial Africa: A Comparative Analysis of 
Imperial Policing in Nyasaland, the Gold Coast and Kenya, in POLICE STUDIES, Vol. 17(1) 45, 
(1994), http://www.cas.sc.edu/socy/faculty/deflem/zcolpol.html (last visited March 25, 2013).  He 
discusses how criminal law and procedure was transplanted from India to Kenya.  
 32. WIENER, supra note 29, at  215. 
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These two types of courts, native and colonial, were meant for different 
people and were also staffed differently.33 In writing about these 
arrangements, Judge Ojwang’ states,  
…the main feature of the judicial system became the distinction 
that was made between native courts and official courts. The 
former dealt with matters involving African parties and 
customary claims; while the official courts applied English law 
and statute law, and were set in a structure which provided for 
appeals right up to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
in England.34 
Therefore, the magistrates and judges who sat in the courts that applied 
English law were all male, white, and British.35 Because of the parallel 
court system, no Africans sat in the courts imposed by the British.36 After 
Kenya’s independence, a process known as ‘Africanization’ of the Bench 
gradually happened as more Kenyans joined the legal profession, both on 
the Bench and the Bar.37 The Kenyan Bar, as at independence in 1963, 
was comprised of predominantly British men, hence Africanization as 
more Kenyans attained law degrees and joined the Kenyan Bar. This 
came as a result of the abolition of parallel courts so that there was only 
one court for all people not two separate courts based on race.38 There is 
a correlation, though not proven empirically, between the number of 
Kenyans who graduated from legal institutions and the steady increase of 
Kenyans on the Bench.39 This was a positive step, but the framework in 
  
 33. See generally JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE YEAR 1937, 
1,13-14, (Government Printer, 1938). Native courts were meant specifically for the indigenous 
people of the country colonized; racially, the native courts were only for black people. 
 34. Ojwang’, supra note 27, at 156. 
 35. See generally JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT ANNUAL REPORT, 1926 – COLONY AND 
PROTECTORATE OF KENYA, (Government Press, 1927). It has different reports for the courts 
and Native Subordinate Courts, 1932 annual report with the references to European staff on page 1, 
1933, 1934, 1935, 1937, and 1938. 
 36. See generally JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT ANNUAL REPORT, 1955, (Government 
Printer, Nairobi 1957). On pages 2 and 3 it gives a list of all the judges serving in 1955 who are all 
English and male. 
 37. See generally Republic of Kenya KENYA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY OFFICIAL 
RECORD, May 1981 (discussing the Parliamentary debate for having Kenyan judges in the 
hansard). http://books.google.com/books?id=3_OAFD9Gk8YC&pg=PA1197&lpg=PA1197&dq=af- 
ricanization+AROUND%285%29+judiciary&source=bl&ots=sOe4_gNQA8&sig=HB4Iuj8oFpIGG
sqtYjE2n_vtbtQ&hl=en&sa=X&ei=ZOI2T_D8LYjXiAKM7sWKCg&ved=0CDMQ6AEwBA#v=o
nepage&q&f=false.  
 38. Ojwang’, supra note 25, at 156. 
 39. See J.B. Ojwang’ & D.R. Salter, The Legal Profession in Kenya, 34 J. Afr. L.9, 25-26 
(1990).They write, “At the time of writing, out of the 31 positions on the High Court bench 
(including the Chief Justice), 14 are held by indigenous Kenyans, while the remainder are held by 
Kenyans of foreign origin and by expatriates serving on contract. The Court of Appeal has three 
vacancies, but the remaining positions are held by Kenya nationals exclusively.  Increasingly, (and 
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the 1963 independence constitution, under which the judiciary operated, 
was tilted heavily towards the Executive, specifically in the powers of 
the President, as seen in the setup of the Judiciary Service Commission 
(JSC).40 Sir Fred Phillips observes that the constitutions written for 
countries achieving independence in Africa were prepared by lawyers 
guided by the colonial office in the respective capital towns. He notes 
that these constitutions contained a clause stating that judges would be 
appointed following the advice of judicial commissions.41 This is how the 
seed for judicial appointments was planted in the 1963 independence 
Constitution of Kenya.42 
The earliest mention of the Judicial Service Commission and indeed an 
attempt to have Kenyans sit on the Bench is in a report covering the 
years 1961-1963, the period just before Kenya’s independence.43  The 
Chief Justice Sir Ronald Sinclair, headed the pre-independence JSC and 
sat with two other judges. The report states, “The Chief Justice 
throughout the period was chairman of the Judicial Service 
Commission…There have been varying numbers of vacancies in the 
establishment of Resident Magistrates over the period, and in fact several 
vacancies are still reserved for qualified African lawyers who, it is 
hoped, will soon apply for appointment.”44 The report goes on to explain 
that many European magistrates retired and were replaced by Asian 
magistrates hired by the JSC, which carried out “an extensive 
recruitment exercise.”45 The report states that there were no African 
lawyers or graduates to be interviewed.46  Nevertheless, the JSC was 
undeterred in its first attempt to diversify and expressed its optimism for 
candidates by reserving places for Africans.47 
  
as should be the case), Kenya nationals have risen to occupy the most crucial, and virtually all, 
judicial positions in the country.” 
 40. See generally Derek Matyszak, Creating a Compliant Judiciary in Zimbabwe, 2000-2003, 
in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER, 331 (Kate Malleson& Peter Russell eds., 
University of Toronto Press 2006). Similar arrangements existed in former British colonies. 
 41. PHILLIPS, supra note 23, at 6. 
 42. Matyszak, supra note 40, at 331. He writes at page 331, “Given the similarity between the 
process of judicial selection provided for the new Zimbabwe and other post-colonial Commonwealth 
countries in Africa, it is reasonable to suppose that the British Foreign Office used a pro forma for 
constitution-making during the decolonization process.” 
 43. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT FOR THE YEARS 1961-1963: 
REPUBLIC OF KENYA, (Government Press Printers 1965). The report is an official government 
record and is significant because it covers the transition period just before Kenya gained 
independence in 1963.  
 44. Id.  
 45. Id.  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id. 
34
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These efforts by the Judicial Service Commission bore fruit as is shown 
in the Judicial Department’s subsequent reports.48  One report states, 
“The first fully qualified local African Resident Magistrate was 
appointed in October 1965, and further appointments of Dar es Salaam 
law graduates were being considered.”49  Thus began the process of 
having more and more Kenyans on the Bench and not just in the low 
levels of the Kenyan Judiciary, but also further up, all the way to the 
Court of Appeal. Chief Justice Miller is accredited with bringing about 
this change.50 Despite these efforts the Kenyan judicial system, until as 
recently as 2010, continued to have vestiges of colonialism.51 
There are many negative aspects of colonialism that scholars elsewhere 
have discussed at length.52 In relation to the JSC and particularly the 
Kenyan Judiciary, a colonial hangover was the dress code of the judges 
and the formality in titles.53 Kenyan judges, like the British, wore white 
wigs on their heads, dressed in robes, and, until recently, retained the 
titles “My Lord” and “Your Ladyship.”54 Magistrates do not wear robes 
and are referred to as “Your Honour.”55  These trappings of colonialism, 
which had a place and served a role at a particular point—that is during 
colonialism—were extremely out of place in independent Kenya in the 
late twentieth century and early twenty-first century.56 The wigs and 
robes demonstrate that, while the idea of a legal transplant may be 
  
 48. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT FOR THE YEARS 1964-1965, 
(Government Printer). 
 49. Compare AHMEDNASIR ABDULLAHI, Retrench These Judges, in The Lawyer, 10-14, 
October 2000, with supra note 47, at 1. Writing in 2000 in the wake of Judge Tuiyott’s appointment, 
Ahmednasir, now a Commissioner with the post-2010 JSC, argued, “It was probably a mistake when 
the bench was fully Africanized and expatriate judges dispensed with. This issue should be 
addressed afresh.”   
 50. See PAUL MWANGI, THE BLACK BAR: CORRUPTION AND POLITICAL INTRIGUE WITHIN 
KENYA’S LEGAL FRATERNITY, 104-131, (Oakland Media Services Limited, 2001).  At page 112, 
Mwangi writes, “To give the devil his due, Miller was not an absolute fiend. During his tenure as 
Chief Justice he managed to totally Africanize the Court of Appeal.” 
 51. See generally NONSO OKAFO, RECONSTRUCTING LAW AND JUSTICE IN A POSTCOLONY, 55-
56, (Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2009). (discussing the tension created by colonialism on 
indigenous law by the imposition of the British). 
 52. See generally CAROLINE ELKINS, IMPERIAL RECKONING: THE UNTOLD STORY OF 
BRITAIN’S GULAG IN KENYA (Henry Hold/Jonathan Cape 2005), DAVID ANDERSON, HISTORIES OF 
THE HANGED: BRITAIN’S DIRTY WAR IN KENYA AND THE END OF THE EMPIRE (W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2005). 
 53. The Hon. Justice (Dr.) Willy Mutunga, S.C., Dressing and Addressing the Kenyan 
Judiciary, KENYA LAW REPORTS, 2011, http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/index.php?id=889 (last visited 
March 29, 2013).  
 54. Id. 
 55. See generally INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ASSISTANCE CONSORTIUM AND INTERNATIONAL 
BAR ASSOCIATION HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, RESTORING INTEGRITY: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 
NEEDS OF THE JUSTICE SYSTEM IN THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA 55-56 (February 2010), 
http://www.ibanet.org/Document/Default.aspx?DocumentUid=DCD20276-7C7C-4321-92A1-
DD43531F93A1.  
 56. Supra note 53. 
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suitable at the onset, it should be modified or remodeled to suit the 
location and circumstances of a new environment, as is the case in 
independent Kenya.57 In summary, Kenya found itself achieving 
independence and becoming a new nation in 1963 with the JSC 
entrenched in the Constitution. 
B. ENGLISH COURTS – A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
King Henry II, who reigned from 1154 to 1189, is attributed to 
establishing the foundation of the English courts as they are known 
today.58  He (and the kings before him) had a Great Council made up of 
eminent people in the society as well as his advisers.59 King Henry II was 
the first to select members from this council to help him preside over his 
kingdom.60 The earliest record of justice being administered by men 
appointed by King Henry II is 1176. King Henry met with his council 
that year and divided the country into six circuits so that three judges 
could visit each circuit; this was the first semblance of a judiciary.61 In 
1178, King Henry II appointed the first bench made up two clerks and 
three laymen.62  Their mandate was to “hear and redress complaints from 
all over England”.63 They were answerable to the Great Council, but this 
changed after the Magna Carta was issued in 1215, when the judges 
found a home in Westminster and their court was given the name the 
Court of Common Pleas.64 
Career judges were common in the thirteenth century and they became a 
permanent feature in later centuries.65 They were different from part-time 
judges because the latter had other duties to perform besides the judicial 
function. This pattern led to the kings appointing judges who had 
experience in legal matters until it became “uncommon, if not yet 
unthinkable, for someone to be appointed a justice of one of the major 
royal courts who did not have a background which equipped him with 
suitable expertise in the law of the courts.”66 This delegation was steeped 
in the early days with allegiance of the judges to the Crown; at least that 
  
 57. Supra note 53 at 3, 11, 21, 44-46. 
 58. PHILLIPS, supra note 23, at 1-6. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. Philips writes at page 1, “He regularized the system of itinerant justices endowing the 
commissioners with powers to adjudicate on pleas relating to possession of land and on pleas of the 
Crown.” 
 61. PHILLIPS, supra note 23, at 1. 
 62. PAUL BRAND, THE ORIGINS OF THE ENGLISH LEGAL PROFESSION 15 (Blackwell 
Publishers, 1992 at 15). 
 63. Id. 
 64. PHILLIPS,supra note 23, at 1. 
 65. BRAND, supra note 62, at 27. 
 66. BRAND supra note 62, at 29. 
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was the expectation of most kings. It was a foregone conclusion for them 
that the judges would do their bidding. Baker aptly states,  
The judges were servants of the Crown, appointed and paid by 
the Crown, and often removable at the pleasure of the 
Crown…Early kings expected subservience from their judges, 
even in legal matters, and it was a long time before the personal 
loyalty which judges owed to the king was transformed into a 
loyalty to the impersonal Crown.67 
The king appointed the first professional judges from clerics.68 In this 
way, judges gained their authority as delegated by the Crown and they 
sat either as judges, which were permanent positions, or as 
commissioners of assize, which were temporary posts.69 This delegation 
by the Crown was a public affair and known to the public.70 Still, these 
judges sat at the pleasure of the king and were subject to removal for at 
the whim of whoever was king or queen at the time. 71 Over time, the role 
of Crown in appointing judges slowly evolved into a function performed 
by the Lord Chancellor.72 
It is unclear how and when the Office of the Lord Chancellor was 
established, but what is certain is that the Office of the Lord Chancellor 
existed before Parliament and the Magna Carta.73 Those who held this 
office were clerics who kept the seal and acted as the King’s conscience. 
A more important function that the Lord Chancellor performed which is 
germane to this discussion is in appointing judges. This function grew 
out of the increasing role of the Lord Chancellor as “head of the legal 
system”.74 The Lord Chancellor acquired the unique status of selecting 
judges by the eighteenth century.75 However, not all Lord Chancellors 
acted in such a biased way. In addition to this, due to the work he was 
  
 67. JOHN HAMILTON BAKER, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 74, 
(Butterworths & Co. Publishers, 1971). 
 68. Id. at 66. 
 69. Id. at 74. 
 70. Id. at 74. 
 71. Id. at 74-75. See also W.S. HOLDWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW, Vol. 1, 
252, Little, Brown, and Company, 1922.  
 72. Kate Malleson, Taking the Politics out of Judicial Appointments? 
http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/2012/02/21/kate-malleson-taking-the-politics-out-of-judicial-
appointments/ (last visited March 29, 2013). 
 73. See Oonagh Gay, The Constitutional Reform Act 2005 – The Role of the Lord Chancellor, 
SN/PC/3792 17 (November 2003), http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN03792.pdf. 
 74. Susanna Frederick Fischer, Playing Poohsticks with the British Constitution - The Blair 
Government's Proposal to Abolish the Lord Chancellor, 24 PENN ST. INT’L L. REV. 257, 268 (2005). 
 75. Id. at 269. 
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required to carry out, the Lord Chancellor soon had administrative 
personnel to assist in his duties.76 
There were rumblings about this appointment process and the role of the 
Lord Chancellor but not much action was taken to redress this issue.77 
Besides, the judges functioned well in their capacity as neutral persons 
hearing cases and rendering decisions in all manner of cases across 
England.78 The main, glaring anomaly was in the selection process, and 
by the beginning of the twenty-first century, a combination of many 
factors made change inevitable.79 One example demonstrates the broad 
over-reaching of the Lord Chancellor from 2001.80 The Lord Chancellor 
at the time was Alexander Andrew Mackay Irvine, Baron Irvine of Lairg 
more commonly referred to as Lord Irvine. He sent out letters to lawyers 
seeking donations for the Labour party.81 His actions caused uproar 
among the members of the bar who, by virtue of the Lord Chancellor’s 
post, felt “intimidated.”82 
III. CHAPTER 2 – CATALYSTS, IMPETUS AND TOOLS FOR 
REFORM 
An analysis of the judicial reform that happened in Kenya and England 
shows that they were driven by the need for transparency, accountability, 
and diversity, though diversity manifests itself differently in Kenya and 
is not openly stated.83 The following different factors contributed to 
reform in each country. 
  
 76. Id. at 269. Fischer writes, “By the early twenty-first century, the Lord Chancellor’s 
Department employed around 12,000 people, and there were predictions that it would double in size 
by 2008.” Some of their duties included administering criminal legal aid and administration for 
tribunals. See also Gay, supra note 73, at 9. 
 77. See Clare Dyer, Falconer Angers Top Judges, THE GUARDIAN, Jan. 12, 2005, 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2005/jan/12/uk.lords?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487 (last visited 
March 29, 2013) 
 78. MALLESON, supra note 15, at 32. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See Abolish The Lord Chancellor, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 22, 2001, 
http://www.economist.com/node/512992 (last visited March 29, 2013).  
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. See Judith L. Maute, English Reforms to Judicial Selection: Comparative Lessons for 
American States, 34 FORDHAM URB.L.J. 387, 405. See also THE REPUBLIC OF KENYA, The Final 
Report of the Taskforce on Judicial Reforms, July 2010. http://www.kenyalaw.org/ 
Downloads/Final%20Report%20of%20the%20Task%20Force%20on%20Judicial%20Reforms.pdf. 
Chapter 2 of this report is a critical analysis of the JSC and proposes steps to increase transparency 
and accountability. 
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A. KENYA: AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAD COME 
In considering the movement for change in judicial appointments in 
Kenya, the best place to start is with the elections held in 2007; this is a 
watershed moment in Kenyan history because of the level and intensity 
of violence surrounding the elections.84 Violent protests erupted after the 
announcement of the presidential results, and chaos persisted in six of the 
eight provinces in the country from December 30, 2007, when the results 
were announced, to February 28, 2008.85 Consequently, approximately 
1,100 died, 3,500 were injured and 600,000 people were displaced.86 
More pertinent to judicial reform, Raila Odinga, a presidential contender 
who felt aggrieved by the election results, rejected the idea of having the 
court resolve the dispute.87 He said, “Everybody knows that the courts in 
Kenya are part of the Executive and we do not want to subject ourselves 
to a kangaroo court.”88 
The crisis ended with an arrangement that appeased the main political 
parties and their respective presidential candidates.89 Part of this 
arrangement included a constitutional overhaul in the form of a new 
Constitution.90  This was not a novel idea, since Kenyan people voted 
against having a new Constitution in a 2005 referendum.91  However, 
another referendum was held in 2010 and this time, an overwhelming 
  
 84. See generally Commission Of Inquiry Into Post-Election Violence (October 2008), 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/Reports/Commission_of_Inquiry_into_Post_Election_Violenc
e.pdf. 
 85. See generally KENYA NATIONAL COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, On the Brink of a 
Precipice: A Human Rights Account of Kenya’s Post-2007 Election Violence, Aug. 15, 2008, 
http://www.marsgroupkenya.org/Reports/OtherReports/KNCHR_REPORT_REPORT_ON_THE_B
RINK_OF_THE_PRECIPE.pdf. 
 86. See INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, Kenya’s Post Election Violence: ICC Prosecutor 
Presents Cases against Six Individuals for Crimes against Humanity, Dec. 15, 2010, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/press%20and%20media/press%20releases/press%20releases%20%282010%29
/Pages/pr615.aspx (last visited March 29, 2013). 
 87. See World Leaders Pile Pressure As Kenyans Pray, AFRICAN PRESS INTERNATIONAL, 
January 7, 2008, http://africanpress.me/2008/01/08/raila-calls-off-his-planned-country-wide-rallies-
bbc-has-reported/ (last visited April 19, 2013).  
 88. Id. See also JEAN TARTTER, Government and Politics, in KENYA – A COUNTRY 
STUDY (Harold D. Nelson ed.), United States Government: Department of the Army (1984) 
181.Tartter writes, “Kenya’s chief justice is appointed by the president of the republic. 
Appointments to all other posts within the judiciary are controlled by the Judicial Service 
Commission. Although the president also appoints the judges of the Court of Appeal and the puisne 
(associate) judges of the High Court, he does so upon the advice of the commission. The commission 
selects, trains, assigns, and is responsible for the discipline of all the country’s magistrates. Judicial 
appointments are permanent, but retirement is mandatory at 68.” 
 89. See generally KOFI ANNAN FOUNDATION, The Kenya National Dialogue and 
Reconciliation: One Year Later, 52-53, March 2009, http://kofiannanfoundation.org/ 
sites/default/files/KA_KenyaReport%20Final.pdf.  
 90. Id. 
 91. See Q&A: Kenya Referendum, BBC NEWS, Nov. 22, 2005, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/4438976.stm (last visited March 29, 2013).  
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majority of Kenyans voted in favor of a new Constitution.92 The 2010 
Constitution was the blueprint for judicial reform, which included 
judicial appointments.  
The 2007 election was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back 
but ultimately ushered in the impetus for judicial reform.93 Prime 
Minister Raila Odinga’s  statement that the courts were ‘kangaroo courts’ 
and his refusal to have the court determine the dispute was based on a 
previous court case – Kibaki vs. Moi.94 Emilio Mwai Kibaki was the 
Petitioner contesting election results (of the 1997 presidential election) 
and he lost both in the High Court and in the Court of Appeal.95 The 
Respondent was President Daniel Toroitich arap Moi and, at that time, 
the Court of Appeal was the highest court in Kenya.96 The Chief Justice, 
then Bernard Chunga, was among the judges who presided over the 
appeal in Kibaki vs. Moi & Others, and had been appointed by President 
Moi in September 1999.97 Aside from being a presidential appointee, 
Chunga was also “personally loyal” to President Moi.98 The High Court 
dismissed Kibaki’s case on a technicality, stating that Kibaki should have 
personally served the President with the election petition challenging the 
results. 99 The Court of Appeal upheld this decision.100 
In 2007, then Chief Justice Evan Gicheru was also a presidential 
appointee.101 This time, the President was Kibaki (the same petitioner in 
Kibaki vs. Moi).102 President Kibaki had served one term of five years—
from 2002 to 2007—and, in 2007, was running for a second term.103 
During his first term he also appointed judges in the same way his 
  
 92. See Kenyans Back Change to Constitution in Referendum, BBC NEWS AFRICA, Aug. 5, 
2010, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-10876635 (last visited March 29, 2013).  The report 
indicates 67% of those who cast their vote wanted a new constitution. 
 93. See generally James Thuo Gathii, Popular Authorship and Constitution Making: 
Comparing and Contrasting the DRC and Kenya, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1109 (2008). 
 94. See generally Kibaki v. Moi, (1999) 2 KLR (EP) 351 (Kenya). 
 95. Id at 352. 
 96. See CONSTITUTION, SECTION 64(1) (1963) (Kenya). 
 97. Mugambi Nthinga, Will Chunga Deliver?, THE LAWYER, October 1999, at 10. 
 98. See Korwa G. Adar & Isaac M. Munyae, Human Rights Abuse in Kenya under Daniel 
Arap Moi, 1978-2001, AFRICAN STUDIES QUARTERLY, Winter 2001, at 13, 
http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v5/v5i1.pdf.  
 99. Id. 
 100. Kibaki vs. Moi, supra note 94, at 352-353. 
 101. See generally John Mwai, Taking the Reform Broom to the Judiciary, NAIROBI LAW 
MONTHLY, April/June 2003, at 5. 
 102. See Profile of His Excellency Hon. Mwai Kibaki, C.G.H., M.P., President and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Defence Forces of the Republic of Kenya, 
http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/presidents/kibaki/kibaki-profile.pdf.  
 103. See Barney Jopson & William Wallis, Spotlight: Mwai Kibaki – Absentee Leader Seeking 
Re-election, FINANCIAL TIMES Dec. 23, 2007, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/564e1668-b17a-11dc-
9777-0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1p6QFZNiL (last visited March 29, 2013). 
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predecessor had done, that is, in a manner that was neither transparent 
nor accountable. It is possible that these factors are what contributed to 
Prime Minister Odinga’s refusal (including his reference to the courts 
being ‘kangaroo courts’ and implicitly stating he would get no justice) to 
have the election dispute settled in court.104 This lack of confidence in the 
judiciary stemming from judicial appointments and lack of political will, 
as well as inefficiency within the justice system, are some of the factors 
that led to Kenya’s case before the International Criminal Court.105 
Once the dust settled, the parties to the Accord wanted to ensure that 
Kenya would not be ripped apart by violence at the next election, so they 
agreed that institutional reform should be carried out expeditiously.106 
The Judiciary was one of the institutions targeted for reform and, in 
particular, the composition and role of the JSC.107   Therefore, for the first 
time in Kenya’s history, there was political will to implement changes in 
the judicial appointment system that did not make the Judiciary 
subservient to the Executive.108 Based on these prevailing circumstances 
at the time, the following catalysts led to reform. 
First of all, political will was a critical component in light of different 
outcomes in the referenda held in 2005 and 2010.109 From both President 
Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga, there was a general consensus that 
the country needed a new constitution as a step towards good 
governance. 110 The new Constitution contained changes to the Judiciary, 
which was an agenda item in what is popularly referred to as the Annan 
  
 104. MWAI, supra note 101, at 5-8. John Mwai at page 5 writes, “Moi’s appointments to the 
office of the Chief Justice were characterized by patronage and appointing those judges who would 
be compliant, not to the wishes of the majority and for enhancement of constitutionalism and the rule 
of law, but to the wishes of the former president and the ruling party, KANU. Appointments to the 
important offices of the High Court and Court of Appeal judges and that of the Chief Justice were 
done after vigorous lobbying and as a reward to those who could not deviate from the wishes of the 
executive.” 
 105. See ICC - Decision Pursuant to Article 15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an 
Investigation into the Situation in the Republic of Kenya, http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200109/court%20reco
rds/chambers/pretrial%20chamber%20ii/Pages/19.aspx (last visited April 19, 2013). 
 106. KOFI ANNAN FOUNDATION, supra note 89, at 10-14.  
 107. See generally Charles A. Khamala, Incremental Judicial Reforms in Kenya, in OXFORD 
TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE RESEARCH: DEBATING INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE IN AFRICA 111(2009),  
http://www.fljs.org/sites/www.fljs.org/files/publications/Justice_in_Africa.pdf.  
 108. MWANGI, supra note 50, at 104-131. 
 109. See SABELO J. NDLOVU-GATSHENI & RUSSEL BRUETON, The Politics of Constitution-
Making and Referendum: The Case of Kenya and Zimbabwe, Aug. 27, 2010, 
http://www.saiia.org.za/sa-foreign-policy-african-drivers-opinion/the-politics-of-constitution-
making-and-referendum-the-case-of-kenya-and-zimbabwe.html (last visited March 29, 2013).  
 110. President Mwai Kibaki & Prime Minister Raila Odinga, Kenya’s Constitution, WASH. 
TIMES, August 12, 2010, available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/aug/12/kenyas-
constitution/(last visited March 29, 2013). 
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Accord.111 The Annan Accord is the name of the agreement reached by 
Kibaki and Odinga that led to the end of post election violence following 
the disputed presidential elections in 2007.112 Therefore, as leaders’ their 
support for the 2010 referendum played a pivotal part in galvanizing the 
Kenyan public to vote for a new constitution.113 It signified the change 
that Kenya desperately needed in its institutions, especially in the 
Judiciary. 114 This is a very different scenario from 2005, when the 
political parties affiliated to President Kibaki and Prime Minister Odinga 
(then just an ordinary Minister) led opposing camps.115 President 
Kibaki’s party called for the nation to accept the new Constitution, while 
Prime Minister Odinga called for a rejection.116  As a result, voters 
rejected a new Constitution.117 Therefore, in considering the catalysts for 
change in judicial appointments, political will was an important factor. 
Secondly, the 2010 Constitution is a major harbinger of judicial reform 
in Kenya as set out in Chapter 10 of the Constitution, which touches on 
the Judiciary.118 The highlights of the changes to the Judiciary include the 
formation of the Supreme Court, the expansion and empowerment of the 
Judicial Service Commission (JSC), and the establishment of the 
judiciary fund.119 
Third is the role of civil society groups, also known as non-governmental 
organizations. The constitutional changes had been proposed and 
discussed by civil society groups for almost seven years and in particular 
by the Law Society of Kenya (LSK).120 These groups recognized in the 
1990s that the only way to bring about change in the judicial 
appointment system was to entrench these changes in the Constitution.121 
  
 111. KOFI ANNAN FOUNDATION, supra note 89, 10-11.The Annan Accord is a power sharing 
agreement between the main presidential contenders of Kenya’s 2007 election. It led to an uneasy 
peace and provided concrete steps on the measures to be taken to ensure lasting peace and address 
the underlying causes that led to the violence following the disputed elections in 2007. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Kibaki & Odinga, supra note 109. 
 114. Makau  wa Mutua, Justice Under Siege: The Rule of Law and Judicial Subservience in 
Kenya, in HUMAN RIGHTS QUARTERLY, 23 (2001): 99, available at 
http://muse.jhu.edu/login?auth=0&type=summary&url=/journals/hrq/v023/23.1mutua.html (last 
visited March 29, 2013). 
 115. Gathii, supra note 93, at 1120-1121. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See CONSTITUTION, Chapter 10 (2010) (Kenya). 
 119. Id. at Art.163, 171-173. A detailed analysis of the JSC follows in Chapter 3 of this paper. 
 120. See Muciimi Mbaka, Judicial Appointments in Kenya, in JUDICIARY WATCH REPORT: 
ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM IN KENYA 1998-2003 45-54 (Ben Sihanya & P. Kichana eds., 
2004). 
 121. See Albert Kamunde, Restructuring and Strengthening Kenya’s Judicial Service 
Commission, in JUDICIARY WATCH REPORT: ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM IN KENYA 1998-2003 
151-163 (Ben Sihanya& P. Kichana eds., 2004). 
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Meaningful change, however, would only be seen if the composition and 
system of choosing judges was made transparent and accountable.122 
These civil society groups produced reports that criticized presidential 
appointments to the Bench and agitated for change.123 They proposed 
ways to address the poor appointment methods, including proposals to 
reform and strengthen the JSC.124 
Last is the influence of public perception of the judiciary, which also 
contributed to calls for reform in judicial appointments. “Why hire a 
lawyer when you can buy a judge?” was the tongue-in-cheek saying that 
captured the endemic corruption within the Kenyan judiciary.125 The 
perception that justice was for sale to the highest bidder (and not blind, 
as demonstrated by the iconic symbol of justice as a blindfolded lady 
holding scales) is what the public came to expect.126 
B. ENGLAND: “AN IDEA WHOSE TIME HAD NOT YET COME”127 
To quote a former Attorney-General of England and Wales the 
system of appointing judges was ‘lamentably amateur’.128 
The catalysts for reform in England and Wales were public perception, 
the impact of decisions from the European Court of Human Rights, and 
the need to modernize and influence from academics.  
Scholars are divided as to whether judicial reform came gradually or 
suddenly to the English judiciary. Some argue that the changes came 
  
 122. Supra note 55, at 94.  
 123. See STATE OF THE RULE OF LAW IN KENYA – 2000: Report by the International 
Commission of Jurists (Kenya Section), International Commission of Jurists (2000). At page 9 the 
Reports provides, “The president still appoints all judges of the high court and court of appeal from 
nominees of a judicial commission entirely appointed by himself. He can remove them on the advice 
of a tribunal entirely appointed by himself. Late last year, he appointed as Chief Justice, a Deputy 
Director of Prosecution famous for the trials and convictions of political dissidents in the late 
eighties.” 
 124. See generally JUDICIARY WATCH REPORT: ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL REFORM IN KENYA 
1998-2003 45-54 (Ben Sihanya & P. Kichana eds., 2004). See also JUDICIARY WATCH REPORT: 
JUDICIAL REFORM IN KENYA 2003-2004, (Maurice Odhiambo Makoloo and Philip Kichana eds., 
2005). KENYA SECTION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS (2005); 
JUDICIARY WATCH REPORT: JUDICIAL REFORM IN KENYA (Philip Kichana ed., 2005). 
 125. See JOHN MWAI, Why Hire A Lawyer When You Can Buy A Judge?, NAIROBI LAW 
MONTHLY, July 2003, at 4. (The Nairobi Law Monthly is an authoritative magazine on legal issues 
in Kenya). 
 126. See Supreme Court Has Work Cut Out For It, THE STANDARD NEWSPAPER,  October 27, 
2011 available at http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000045730&cid=16&story= 
Supreme%20Court%20has%20work%20cut%20out%20for%20it (last visited March 29, 2013).  
 127. See Andrew Le Sueur, From Appellate Committee to Supreme Court: A Narrative, in THE 
JUDICIAL HOUSE OF LORDS 64 (Louis Blom-Cooper, Brice Dickson, & Gavin Drewryeds, 2009). 
 128. PHILLIPS, supra note 23, at 15. 
18
Annual Survey of International & Comparative Law, Vol. 19 [2013], Iss. 1, Art. 7
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/annlsurvey/vol19/iss1/7
2013] REFORM OF JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 63 
suddenly, while others argue that the discussion of what needed to 
change had been going on for years prior to Tony Blair’s announcement 
in June 2003.129 Nevertheless, the proposals received much criticism from 
critics and senior judges.130 
These senior judges had a common thread in that they were all appointed 
by the Lord Chancellor.131 Judith Maute observes: 
There was no need for formality in the appointment system 
because the Lord Chancellor his staff, and the judges consulted 
were quite familiar with the small pool of eligible candidates. 
Once it was done in smoke-filled rooms of gentlemen’s clubs or 
in the Temple corridors. Lawyers were appointed to be judges 
after the right word in the ear; they were “tapped on the 
shoulder” and asked if they fancied promotion to the Bench. 
Whom you knew counted; as did your college or school…The 
sheer volume of new appointments required a more formal, 
professionalized process administered by departmental staff. 
Nevertheless, the heart of the system remained closed, with 
private consultations, or “secret soundings” about individual 
candidates conducted by the Lord Chancellor or his staff with 
senior members of the bench and bar. These anonymous 
subjective reviews, described in 1973 by Sir Robert Megarry as 
“a mysterious system of osmosis and grapevine,” often 
determined a candidacy, with comments that one was a “good 
chap,” socially inept, or based on explanation of a single court 
performance.132 
The selection process described above led to a homogenous bench and 
public increasingly perceived the bench as being far removed from the 
reality of everyday life for ordinary citizens.133 However, it was critical to 
have diversity on the bench.134 While there is little empirical evidence to 
support the view that having a Bench that reflects society influences the 
  
 129. Malleson, supra note 72, at 102. 
 130. Fischer, supra note 74, at 264. See also Judge Selection Plan Criticized, BBC NEWS, 
October 6, 2004, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/3720952.stm (last visited March 29, 2013).  
 131. Maute, supra note 83, at 395. Maute writes, “An at-will political appointee of the elected 
Prime Minister, the Lord Chancellor sat in the Cabinet of the executive branch, served as the 
Speaker of the House of Lords, led the Lord Chancellor’s Department (which is roughly equivalent 
to the United States Department of Justice), and was head of the judiciary. The Lord Chancellor had 
primary responsibility for selecting all judges in England and Wales.” 
 132. Id. at 396-397. 
 133. Id. at 403. 
 134. Kate Malleson, Creating A Judicial Appointments Commission: Which Model Works 
Best?, in PUBLIC LAW105 (Spring 2004). 
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decisions made, “the corrosive impact of their absence on the legitimacy 
is now too great to ignore.”135 
A second catalyst for reform was the political landscape both within the 
United Kingdom, as well as that of the European Union.136 In the United 
Kingdom, the Labour Party had won a second term by the time Tony 
Blair announced the changes to the judiciary in England and Wales.137 
Change within the judicial structure was part of the Labour Party 
campaign platform at the time, so his proposal caught many by 
surprise.138 The government recognized the necessity for reforms to gain 
credence both locally and abroad that the judicial system promoted and 
valued the tenets of democracy and human rights.  It also needed to 
demonstrate that justice was being done.139 
The impetus for change developed into a pressing need after the United 
Kingdom passed the Human Rights Act 1998 and the reform of the 
European Court of Human Rights.140 It became apparent that the arena of 
enforcing rights would move from Parliament to courts, and these courts 
were not ready for the challenge.141 The decisions that judges made 
  
 135. Id. at 106. 
 136. Mary L. Clark, Advice and Consent vs. Silence and Dissent? The Contrasting Roles of the 
Legislature in U.S. and U.K. Judicial Appointments, 71 LA. L. REV. 451, 481 (2011). 
 137. See James Vallance White, The Judicial Office in, in THE JUDICIAL HOUSE OF LORDS 46 
(Louis Blom-Cooper, Brice Dickson, & Gavin Drewry eds, 2009). Vallance writes, “However, on 12 
June 2003, in a statement expected to be concerned with ministerial changes, the Government 
announced that the jurisdiction of the House of Lords would be ended and that its functions would in 
the future be carried out by a supreme court. This is not the place to discuss the merits of that 
decision, but it is worth reflecting on the difference between the way it was announced and the 
years-indeed decades-of public debate which preceded the settlement of 1876.” 
 138. Id. White writes, “Although it is true that a number of eminent lawyers and academics over 
the years had expressed their support for the establishment of a supreme court, there had not been the 
succession of government green and white papers which might have been expected to precede an 
announcement of such constitutional importance, nor was it made in fulfillment of a manifesto 
commitment.” 
 139. FISCHER, supra note 74, at 263. 
 140. Clark, supra note 136, at 480-481. The Human Rights Act 1998 made it untenable for the 
Lord Chancellor to continue to be a member of all three arms of government like he had been before 
it was passed. See also Gay, supra note 73, at 14. 
 141. See Dawn Oliver, The Lord Chancellor as Head of the Judiciary, in THE JUDICIAL HOUSE 
OF LORDS 1876-2009 97-111 (Louis Blom-Cooper, Brice Dickson and Gavin Drewry eds., 2009). At 
pages110-111, she writes “The pressure for change came from a number of quarters: the lack of 
clarity about when it was or was not appropriate for a Lord Chancellor to sit as a judge in cases 
involving governmental interests, coupled with the case law of the European Court of Human Rights 
on Article 6 of the ECHR, indicating that the UK arrangements were unlikely to stand up if 
challenged before that court; the steady rise over a long period in the importance of the Lord Chief 
Justice as the recognized professional head of the judiciary-the Chief; in recent year the combination 
of aggressive criticism of the judges by Home Secretaries and other ministers which Lord 
Chancellors had not been able to restrain; rather stubborn insistence by Lord Chancellor Irvine on 
his own authority to determine how the powers of the office should be exercised and increasingly 
unconvincing assertions that he could be both a party politician and head of the judiciary; and finally 
the increased workload attaching to the Cabinet and executive roles of the Lord Chancellor.” 
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would bring them more and more into the limelight, and their manner of 
appointment was inevitably bound to be a topic of discussion in the legal 
fraternity.142 In addition, there was the direct consequence of the United 
Kingdom being part of the European Union and its obligation to ensure 
that the decisions from the European Court of Human Rights were 
enforceable and binding on English courts.143 Enacting the Human Rights 
Act and incorporating the decisions of the European Court on Human 
Rights provided more impetus for reform because the final appellate 
court was no longer the House of Lords.144 Dissatisfied parties could seek 
recourse in the European Court of Human Rights.145 It was no longer 
business as usual, and the system of appointment that had served well for 
hundreds of years was not compatible with the 21st century.146 In 
addition, decisions from the European Court of Justice also influenced 
the rulings and judgments of the courts within the United Kingdom and 
ultimately led to the change instituted by Tony Blair.147 
Yet another critical factor that influenced reform in the judiciary in 
England and Wales is the office of the Lord Chancellor.148 The Lord 
Chancellor was a member of the Cabinet and the House of Lords, in 
addition to heading the Judiciary and chairing the Judicial Committee in 
the House of Lords.149 In this set up, the doctrine of separation of powers 
did not exist in the person of the Lord Chancellor.150 Dawn Oliver 
explains: 
It was not always easy to determine whether the old-style Lord 
Chancellor was exercising his role as head of the judiciary, or his 
role as a member of the Cabinet – or both, at any given time. 
(His role as Speaker of the House of Lords did not raise 
difficulties of that kind). There were grey areas between the head 
  
 142. Peter Russell, Conclusion in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER 421 
(Kate Malleson & Peter Russell eds., University of Toronto Press 2006).  
 143. Oliver, supra note 141, at 111. 
 144. Clark, supra note 136, at 481. 
 145. Oliver, supra note 141, at 111. 
 146. Russell, supra note 142, at 421. 
 147. Clark, supra note 135, at 481. She writes at page 481, “Because ECJ rulings are supreme, 
national courts, including the U.K.’s highest court, have been empowered to strike down inconsistent 
domestic law, including constitutional law. This growth in judicial power was an overarching factor 
driving both the creation of the new Supreme Court and the overhaul of the judicial appointment 
system.” 
 148. Oliver, supra note 141, at 97. She writes, “Although it is impossible to identify specific 
statutory or formal provisions as the old-style Lord Chancellor’s role as head of the judiciary, that 
role was of central importance, especially to many members of the judiciary, and when the CRA 
reforms were announced it was the end of this role that caused the most anguish among judges.”  
 149. See Lord Mance, Constitutional Reforms, The Supreme Court And The Law Lords, in 
CIVIL JUSTICE QUARTERLY Apr. 2006: 155, 155-156. 
 150. Oliver, supra note 141, at 97. 
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of the judiciary and member of the Cabinet roles and the lines 
were fuzzy.151 
Within the judiciary, the Lord Chancellor made the judicial appointments 
in England, Wales and Northern Ireland.152 His department contained the 
whole machinery of filling in the appointments from initial advertising to 
final appointment; and he did this for judges in England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland.153 In fact, he “had tremendous influence over all 
aspects of the English judiciary.”154 The Lord Chancellor’s role, 
particularly in this aspect of appointments, led to his being criticized for 
cronyism, partisanship and lack of public accountability.155 Therefore, 
reforming the Lord Chancellor’s office seemed an idea whose time had 
come. Canadian scholar Lorraine Eisenstat Weinrib described the Lord 
Chancellor’s appointment method in the following terms: 
He does not consult with cabinet colleagues but works from his 
own familiarity the members of the bar, confers with senior 
members of the judiciary, and relies upon the work of a small but 
important office in the permanent civil service…This system 
offers no checks and balances either before or after appointment, 
no representation from the bar or the public, no formal 
procedures or criteria of selection, other than experience at the 
bar.156 
What some found distasteful about the process of reforming judicial 
appointments is how it was initiated and the manner it was carried out, 
because these appointments were carried out suddenly without 
discussion, consultation, or notice.157 
The final catalyst in changing the way judges were appointed in England 
and Wales was the influence of the academic community. Some scholars 
had long predicted the judicial reforms instituted by Tony Blair in June 
2003 because the appointment process was insulated and 
undemocratic.158 These commentators include Sir Thomas Legg, 
Professors Robert Hazell, Andrew Le Sueur, Kate Malleson, Robert 
  
 151. Oliver, supra note 141, at 98. 
 152. Fischer, supra note 74 at 271.See Oliver, supra note 141, at 103. 
 153. Fischer, supra note 74, at 272. 
 154. Maute, supra note 83, at 398. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Weinrib, supra note 5, at 114. 
 157. Malleson, supra note 15, at 39. She writes at page 39, “The clumsy manner in which the 
reforms were introduced should, therefore, be distinguished from their general desirability.” 
 158. Clark, supra note 136, at 474. 
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Stevens and Diana Woodhouse.159 For these commentators, the question 
was not whether there would or should be reform in the judiciary, but 
rather how the reform would be carried out.160 They proposed suggestions 
such as involving the Houses of Parliament in the screening of judges 
and the inclusion of a Supreme Court, whose nominees would be 
questioned and confirmed by Parliament.161 Some of these proposals, like 
involving Parliament, never saw the light of day but the underlying 
principles of accountability and transparency were entrenched when the 
JAC was set up.162 
Those were the unique catalysts that contributed to the reform of judicial 
appointments in both countries. The tipping point in both Kenya and 
England and Wales was political will; it was this political desire that led 
to judicial commissions as they exist today.  
IV. A CRITICAL LOOK AT THE JUDICIAL SERVICE 
COMMISSION AND JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS 
COMMISSION  
A. KENYA -THE JUDICIAL SERVICE COMMISSION: PRE-2010 AND 
POST-2010 
The Judicial Service Commission (JSC) is a constitutional institution 
with its composition and mandate stipulated in the Kenyan 
Constitution.163 The modalities of the JSC are expressed in further detail 
in the Judicial Service Act, 2011.164 Twelve members comprise the JSC, 
including the Chief Registrar (non-voting member) of the High Court, 
who acts as the Secretary to the JSC,165 and five members who are from 
the Judiciary. These include the Chief Justice, who is the Chairperson of 
the JSC, one Supreme Court judge, one Court of Appeal judge, one High 
Court judge and one Magistrate.166 These judicial officers are chosen by 
their peers, thereby equally representing all levels of the Kenyan 
  
 159. Id. 
 160. Id.  
 161. Id. at 475. 
 162. Id. at 476-478. 
 163. Supra note 118, at Art. 171-173. 
 164. In its introductory statement the Judicial Service Act is described as  “An Act of 
Parliament to make provision for judicial services and administration of the Judiciary; to make 
further provision with respect to the membership and structure of the Judicial Service Commission; 
the appointment and removal of judges and the discipline of other judicial officers and staff; to 
provide for the regulation of the Judiciary Fund and the establishment, powers and function of the 
National Council on Administration of Justice for connected purposes.” (The Judicial Service Act is 
available at http://www.elaw.org/node/5689.) 
 165. Supra note 117, at Art.171. 
 166. Id. at Art.171 (2)(a)-(d). The Chief Registrar does not have the power to vote on issues in 
the JSC. 
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judiciary.167 The other members of the JSC are the Attorney-General, two 
lawyers admitted to the Kenyan Bar with at least fifteen years 
experience,168 “one person nominated by the Public Service Commission 
and one woman and one man to represent the public, not being lawyers 
appointed by the President with the approval of the National 
Assembly.”169 Therefore, the majority of the members in the JSC are not 
from the judiciary.170 
In judicial councils that have a majority of the members as judges, it is 
assumed that the judges will use this majority to self-regulate their 
members, and the underlying thought is that there will be greater 
independence in the judicial council.171 Through empirical analysis 
collected from 121 judicial councils, democracies have strong judicial 
councils and these, in turn, have a majority of the members as judges.172 
Furthermore, this strength will be seen if the judges act “as a 
homogenous body.”173  In fact, 93 of the 121 judicial councils observed 
were cited in the country’s constitution and ostensibly embedded in it as 
a way to protect them from executive interference.174 This prevents 
manipulation and ensures independence.175 
The JSC that existed before the new Constitution in 2010 (hereinafter 
‘pre-2010 JSC’) was also a constitutional organ entrenched in the 
Constitution.176 It was made up of five members—the Chief Justice (as 
Chairperson), the Attorney-General, two judges appointed by the 
President from the Court of Appeal and the High Court and the Chairman 
  
 167. Id. at Art.171(2)(b)-(d). See also D.B.M Mosotah, On the Cusp of Judicial Rebirth, 
NAIROBI LAW MONTHLY 26, March 2011, at 26-28. At page 26, Mosotah writes, “Each cadre of the 
courts is entitled to elect one representative to the commission; thus a Court of Appeal judge is 
elected by the Judges of Appeal, a High Court Judge is elected by the Judges of the High Court and a 
Magistrate is elected by magistrates” 
 168. The term used in Kenya for lawyers admitted to the Bar is ‘advocate’. These lawyers must 
be one male and one female and are chosen by the local Bar Association known as the Law Society 
of Kenya to which all lawyers join as soon as they are licensed to practice. 
 169. Supra note 118, at Art. 171(2)(e)-(h). 
 170. Supra note 118, at Art. 171(2). 
 171. Supra note 8, at 121. 
 172. Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note 8, at 121.  
 173. Id., at 122. Garoupa and Ginsburg are quick to caution that it is a simplistic view to think 
that having a majority of judges in the judicial council automatically leads to independence since 
there are country specific variables that must be considered. At page 130 they write, “We found little 
evidence in favour of the widespread assumption that councils increase quality or independence in 
the aggregate. Therefore, we emphasize the complexity of the role of a judicial council and reject the 
simplistic view that importing or transplanting certain types of judicial council is likely to have a 
decisive impact on the quality of the judiciary. We thus reject the view of international organizations 
that assert that judges should always and everywhere form the majority of members on the Council.” 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id., at 123. 
 176. See CONSTITUTION, Art. 68, 69 (2008) (Kenya). 
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of the Public Service Commission.177 The pre-2010 JSC was described in 
the Constitution as an appointing commission with the mandate to 
appoint, discipline and remove judicial officers.178 
Commenting on the Kenyan JSC, Makau wa Mutua, a leading Kenyan 
scholar writing about the pre-2010 JSC, states:  
In any case, all JSC members are presidential appointees, either 
directly or indirectly, because he appoints the Attorney-General, 
the Chief Justice, and the Chairman of the Public Service 
Commission. Thus the president personally composes without 
any constitutionally required oversight or mandatory input from 
any other source, the most important judicial commission in the 
country.179 
Therefore, the appointment of judges was ultimately vested in the 
president and, accordingly, the JSC was an extension of the Executive.180 
Under the pre-2010 JSC, judicial appointments at the High Court level 
for judges were not transparent.181 Mutua observes that there was no 
consultation at all regarding the candidates that the president appointed 
as judges.182 It is unclear if these selections were based on merit, which is 
not to cast aspersions on the candidates appointed as judges.183 However, 
there never was a clear guideline on how judges were appointed with the 
pre-2010 JSC, and these appointments sometimes led to embarrassing 
consequences.184 
  
 177. CONSTITUTION, Art. 68 (1) (2008) (Kenya). See also Matyszak , supra note 40, at 330-354 
(discussing a similar arrangement that exists in Zimbabwe).  
 178. Supra note 176, at Art. 69 (1). 
 179. Mutua, supra note 114, at 104. See also du Bois, supra note 11, at 280, 283.  
 180. OJWANG, supra note 27, at 156.  He writes at page 156, “The President appoints the 
Chief Justice, who also serves as Chairman of the Judiciary Service Commission. This Commission 
then operates as an advisory body to the President, in the appointment of all other judges, of the 
High Court as well as the Court of Appeal.” 
 181. I make this distinction because the hiring of magistrates was done very differently. 
 182. Mutua, supra note 114, at 104.See also Russell, supra note 142, at 424. This situation 
described by Mutua is similar to the Zimbabwe JSC in terms of the composition of the JSC and 
president’s hand in selecting the members. Peter Russell observes that the composition of the 
Zimbabwe JSC was designed to have a ‘compliant judiciary’. The same can be said of Kenya’s pre-
2010 JSC. 
 183. Mosotah, supra note 167, at 26-28. On page 27, Mosotah writes, “In past appointments, 
political connections and tribal considerations – sometimes referred to as ‘jobs for the boys’ – 
prevailed over integrity and ability. Consequently, the quality of justice began to deteriorate. It is 
only by chance that we find some bright and exceptionally good judges on the Bench.” 
 184. Id. at 27.  Mosotah writes at page 27, “The system was opaque and made it impossible to 
determine the process of selection and appointment. Besides, there was a manifest lack of 
consultation among stakeholders.” 
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For example, in April 2009, President Kibaki appointed seven judges; of 
these, five joined the High Court and two judges were elevated from 
being high court judges to Court of Appeal judges.185 Out of the five high 
court judges, three were career judicial officers who were Chief 
Magistrates, the highest rank within the magistracy.186 The other two 
were lawyers who met the requirements stipulated in the 1963 
Constitution.187 In less than a year, one of these lawyers (now a judge) 
was arrested and charged by the Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission, an 
institution whose mandate includes the facilitation of recovery for ill-
gotten wealth.188 He was charged under the Anti-Corruption and 
Economic Crimes Act with fraudulently making payments from the sale 
of public property and faced an alternative charge of abuse of office.189 
The charge stated the judge committed this crime in July 2008 while he 
was a company secretary; he was charged together with his superior. 190 
The case went to trial and the judge and his co-accused were 
subsequently acquitted.191 An important point to highlight is that the 
information about the judge’s record may have come to light if there was 
more input from different sources about judges prior to their 
appointment, but the pre-2010 JSC did not take this into consideration.192 
Above all, the damage done to the public’s perception of the Kenyan 
Judiciary was massive, because the public believed the judiciary to be 
above reproach.193 While the judge was acquitted, the ordeal still left a 
  
 185. See press release from State House, the official residence of the Kenyan President 
available at http://www.statehousekenya.go.ke/news/april09/2009020401.htm.  
 186. See The Magistrates’ Court Act, (2007) Cap. 10 § 5 (1). (Kenya). 
 187. Section 61(3) of the 1963 Constitution states:  “A person shall not be qualified to be 
appointed a judge of the High Court unless –  
(a) he is, or has been, a judge of a court having unlimited jurisdiction in civil and 
criminal matters in some part of the Commonwealth or in the Republic of Ireland or 
a court having jurisdiction in appeals from such a court; or 
(b) he is an advocate of the High Court of Kenya of not less than seven years standing; 
or  
(c) he holds, and has held for a period of, or periods amounting in the aggregate to, not 
less than seven years, one or other of the qualifications specified in paragraphs (a), 
(b), (c) and (d) of section 12(1) of the Advocates Act as in force on 12th December, 
1963.” 
 188. See Press Release, The Kenya Anti-Corruption Commission (KACC), 
http://www.eacc.go.ke/archives/pressreleases/chitembe-arrest.pdf. 
 189. Muchemi Wachira & Casper Waithaka, Anti-Graft Team Arrests Judge, THE DAILY 
NATION, December 28, 2009, http://mobile.nation.co.ke/News/-/1290/832294/-
/format/xhtml/item/0/-/10oiqg6z/-/index.html  (last visited March 29, 2013). 
 190. Evelyn Njoroge, Kenyan Judge Denies Graft, CAPITALFM NEWS, December 29, 2009, 
http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2009/12/kenyan-judge-denies-graft-charge/ (last visited March 29, 
2013).  
 191. See Wahome Thuku, Judge, Ex-NSSF Boss Acquitted in Land Fraud Case, THE 
STANDARD, October 31, 2011, http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000045966&story_ 
title=Judge,-ex-NSSF-boss-acquitted-in-land-fraud-case  (last visited March 29, 2013). 
 192. Mutua, supra note 114, at 104. 
 193. See generally Dearbhail McDonald, Why Our Judges Must Be Like Caesar’s Wife, IRISH 
INDEPENDENT, October 20, 2007, http://www.independent.ie/national-news/why-our-judges-must-
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nasty taste in the mouths of many and tainted the Kenyan Judiciary. 
Ultimately, it revealed the deep chasms in the pre-2010 JSC appointment 
procedure and its very weak role in having the selection and appointment 
of judges.194 The Minister of Justice and Constitutional Affairs at the time 
was Martha Karua. She resigned after these seven judges took their oaths 
of office.195 One report attributed the resignation of Ms. Karua to one 
particular judge’s appointment.196 She said, “Judges are being appointed 
without my knowledge and a lot more.”197 It should be noted that there 
was no role delineated in the 1963 Constitution for the Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Affairs in the appointment of judicial 
officers.198 Ms. Karua compared her role as being Minister to being 
valued stakeholder in this process and felt slighted for not being 
consulted.199 
The post-2010 JSC was a very different body from its predecessor, and 
this difference was not only in its composition.200 Its modus operandi and 
selection of judges, in particular, had infused an air of confidence and 
change that the Kenyan justice system desperately needed.201 The fact 
that the judiciary has changed, is a view held by a Commissioner in the 
post-2010 JSC. He was one of the harshest critics of the Kenyan 
Judiciary.202 Article 172(1)(a)refers to the post-2010 JSC as a 
  
be-like-caesars-wife-1200209.html (last visited March 29, 2013). The writer reports about a situation 
in Ireland but the same analogy can be made in Kenya and indeed anywhere around the world that 
judges must be above reproach. 
 194. Mutua, supra note 114, at 104. 
 195. See Duncan Miriri, Martha Karua Resigns From Her Ministerial Position, THE KENYA 
WEEKLY POST, April 6, 2009, http://www.kenyaweeklypost.com/modules.php? 
name=News&file=article&sid=430 (last visited March 29, 2013). 
 196. Muchemi & Waithaka, supra note 188. Their report states, “Ms. Karua, however, singled 
out Justice Chitembwe’s case saying he had been sacked from the NSSF for corruption. Ms. Karua, 
who is the Gichugu MP, resigned when President Kibaki went ahead and swore in the judges.”  
 197. See Kenya Coalition Minister Resigns, BBC NEWS, April 6, 2009, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/7985805.stm (last visited March 29, 2013).  
 198. See supra note 96, at § 61(2). 
 199. See Kenya Justice Minister Martha Karua Resigns, 
http://africanewsonline.blogspot.com/2009/04/kenya-justice-minister-martha-karua.html  (last 
visited March 29, 2013).The report stated, “As the Minister in charge of Justice, Ms. Karua expected 
to be consulted before new judges were appointed. ‘If my hands are tied and the Judiciary continues 
to be used as a place where people sacked from parastatals are recycled, the agenda is forestalled and 
all reforms are annihilated then I better leave and fight for the rights of ordinary 
mwananchi[people],’ she said after the appointments.”  
 200. Mosotah supra note 167, at 27. 
 201. See AHMEDNASIR ABDULLAHI, Our New Look Judiciary Is the Best, Let’s Embrace 
It, Sunday Nation, February 12, 2012, available at 
http://www.nation.co.ke/oped/Opinion/Our+new+look+judiciary+is+the+best+lets+embrace+it+/-
/440808/1324972/-/item/1/-/kx3816z/-/index.html.  
 202. Id. Cf. with the views by the same Ahmednasir Abdullahi in, Retrench These Judges’ The 
Lawyer, 10-14, October 2000 published by Legal Media Limited. At page 10, he said, “Rather it is 
the product of decades of a state mechanism deliberately executed to undermine the rule of law in 
the country. The underlying factors that have contributed to this unsatisfactory state of affairs are, 
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recommending body but the reality is that in the  one year since it began 
its work, the President has not rejected any of the recommendations 
made by the JSC.203 
The JSC has also changed the manner in which it fills the vacancies.204 In 
the past, there was no notification that there were vacancies even when it 
was clear there was a shortage in the number of judicial officers.205 
Today, the post-2010 JSC advertises vacancies for judges both in the 
newspapers and online.206  This is a historic change; previously, only 
vacancies for magistrates were advertised.207 The advertisement sets out 
clearly the constitutional requirements and also requests the candidate to 
submit a detailed resume that includes evidence of “community service, 
financial discipline, pro bono activity, involvement as a party in litigation 
and involvement in political activity… three professional referees and 
two character references.”208 After processing these applications, the JSC 
advertises the names of the applicants and those it has shortlisted for 
interviewing.209 This invitation also invites members of the public to 
write in with any information they have about the candidates.210 The 
caveat is that the JSC will interview the letter writers, but these 
  
firstly the caliber of judges appointed by the executive leaves a lot to be desired. The executive in 
appointing judges applies a “secret” test unknown to anyone including the Bar and the citizens of the 
country.” At page 13 he wrote, “It is a matter of public record that many judges just like Tuyiott 
have no university education. There are many judges who just like Tuyiott have delivered queer 
judgments that have no basis in law and fact.  At page 14 he concludes his treatise, “Magistrates 
should never be appointed to become judges, and lawyers practicing law in remote regions should be 
re-educated before being appointed judges.” 
 203. Article 172(1)(a) provides, “The Judicial Service Commission shall promote and facilitate 
the independence and accountability of the judiciary and the efficient, effective and transparent 
administration of justice and shall recommend to the President persons for appointment as judges;” 
 204. See Kenyan Jobs & Vacancies and Career Advice, http://www.careersmartkenya.com/ 
2011/10/judicial-service-commission-jsc-job.html (last visited March 29, 2013). Note the 
advertisement for Court of Appeal judges posted on October 5, 2011. It is the most recent selection 
of judges to a court. 
 205. The Judicature Act, 2007, Cap. 8 § 7. (Kenya).The Judicature Act sets out the hierarchy of 
courts in Kenya and specifies the numbers required to fill each court. 
 206. See Latest Kenyan Jobs and Vacancies, http://www.kenyancareer.com/2011/04/supreme-
court-judges-and-high-court.html (last visited March 29, 2013).  
 207. Supra note 55, at 55-60 (discussing the conditions of magistrates in Kenya). 
 208. Supra note 204.  See Christopher Kendall, Criticism And Reform: A Survey Of Canadian 
Literature Of The Appointment Of Judges, in APPOINTING JUDGES: PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND 
PRACTICE, 211, 211-230 (Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1991). Kendall writes about a similar 
process in Canada in 1991, quoting K. Makin in an article that appeared in The Toronto Globe & 
Mail, February 22, 1990 at A13.  Makin states, “The committee advertises through news media for 
candidates, who are interviewed rigorously on developments in the law, on their community 
involvement, and on their personal attitudes to sensitive issues. Each candidate must supply four 
references and the list that is eventually sent by the committee to Mr. Scott [Attorney General] goes 
beyond ranking, including detailed comments on each candidate’s strengths and weaknesses.” 
 209. See Nzau Musau, Shortlisting Complete For Advertised Judges Positions, THE STAR 
NEWSPAPER (May 28, 2011), available at http://www.the-star.co.ke/national/national/26060-
shortlisting-complete-for-advertised-judges-positions (last visited March 29, 2013).     
 210. Id. 
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proceedings must remain confidential.211 Another major change is that 
the interviews are open to the public and have even been aired live on 
one of the local television stations in real-time.212 Candidates are asked a 
variety of questions ranging from their legal competence to their views 
about what members of the public have written them (though the names 
of those who have written are not disclosed).213 Finally, after concluding 
the interviewing process, the list of successful candidates is made public 
through broadcast and written media, and then they take the oath of 
office before the President.214 
B. JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION 
The Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) is an independent 
commission that selects candidates for judicial office in England 
and Wales, and for some tribunals whose jurisdiction extends to 
Scotland or Northern Ireland.215 
Unlike in Kenya, the Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) had no 
predecessor216 and is an organ created ostensibly under the Constitution 
Reform Act 2005.217 The CRA also created a second tier judicial 
commission to handle the heavy volume of appointments in the lower 
courts.218The  establishment of the JAC was mired in controversy 
because the CRA did not just introduce a new way of selecting judges in 
England.219 It drastically altered the office of the Lord Chancellor and 
introduced a Supreme Court, a new level in the judicial hierarchy of 
  
 211. Id. 
 212. See generally John Ngirachu, Kenya: Public Interviews For Top Judiciary Jobs Praised As 
Leaders Welcome Nominees, ALL AFRICA, May 13, 2011, 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201105160151.html (last visited March 29, 2013).    See also du Bois, 
supra note 11, at 280, 288 (for a similar practice taking place in South Africa). 
 213. Musau, supra note 209. 
 214. See Wahome Thuku, Chief Justice Nominates Judges, THE STANDARD, December 10, 
2011, available at http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/InsidePage.php?id=2000048149&cid=4 (last 
visited March 29, 2013). This was the news announcement from a leading Kenyan station. See also 
CJ Names New Court of Appeal Judges, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=A5tJMaffSL8 (last 
visited March 29, 2013).  
 215. See About the JAC, http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/about-jac/about-jac.htm (last visited March 
29, 2013).   
 216. See Maute, supra note 83, at 387-389.Maute notes, “Historically, British judges were 
selected by the powerful Lord Chancellor, using stringent (but sometimes unstated) eligibility 
criteria and “secret soundings” – process of anonymous consultation with unnamed sitting judges.” 
 217. Hereinafter CRA. 
 218. Clark, supra note 136, at 478-479. According to Clark, the JAC is the second commission 
because the first is the Supreme Court appointment commission that deals with filling vacancies in 
the Supreme Court. 
 219. Id. 480. 
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courts, and the last appellate court (thereby replacing the House of Lords 
as the last appellate court in England).220 
Schedule 12 of the CRA states that the JAC shall be made of 15 
members, five of whom are from the judiciary.221 Thus the judges on this 
judicial commission are the minority but what is even more interesting is 
that the Chairperson of the JAC is a lay person.222 The CRA does not 
specify the criteria for the Commissioners on the JAC but the lay 
members who form the majority are selected through a transparent 
process.223 Judith Maute, writing on the selection of the commissioners 
comments, “Commissioners must be selected through an open 
application process in accordance with “The Nolan Principles of Public 
Life,” requiring selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, 
openness, honesty, and leadership.”224 The term of a commissioner is five 
years and can be renewed once.225 
Perhaps the best indicator of the success of the JAC is in the diversity on 
the Bench. Kate Malleson, summed it fittingly:  
The narrow background from which the judiciary is drawn, 
particularly at senior levels, has become its Achilles’ heel. 
Almost the only fact that many people know about judges in 
England and Wales is that they are generally elderly, white, male 
barristers educated at private schools and Oxbridge.226 
This was the public perception of the English Bench in England and 
Wales as well as abroad.227 However, the JAC has made concerted efforts 
to address this deficiency and this is expressed in its slogan during of its 
  
 220. See Fischer, supra note 74, at 257, 262.  
 221. Constitutional Reform Act, 2005.4, § 2, sched.12 (Eng.). 
 222. Id. See generally Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, The Comparative Law and Economics 
of Judicial Councils, 27 BERKELEY J. INT’L. L. 53, 82 (2009). They write, “The JAC is composed of 
15 commissioners drawn from the judiciary, the legal profession (one barrister and one solicitor), the 
lay magistracy, and the lay public. The Chairman of the Commission is required to be a lay 
member.” 
 223. Maute, supra note 83, at 412-413. 
 224. Id. at 414. She makes it clear that the Commissioners are selected by application and are 
processed through a ‘meticulously-selected panels’. 
 225. Supra note 221, at §§ 12-13. 
 226. Malleson, supra note 134, at 105. 
 227. Maute, supra note 83, at 389. She writes, “As a practical matter, these forces produced an 
English judiciary consisting almost exclusively of older white males drawn from the highest ranks of 
senior barristers-the most elite branch of the English legal profession. Many in the public perceived 
the judiciary as socially biased and out-of-touch.” See also Weinrib, supra note 5, at 113. She 
provides a Canadian perspective on the British judiciary in her introductory remarks. She writes, 
“The Lord Chancellor, appointed at the recommendation of the Prime Minister, makes 
recommendations for superior court appointments and is influential in bringing forward names for 
the positions of Law Lord, Lord Chief Justice and Master of the Rolls.” 
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first year which was, “Committed to Merit.”228 A more concrete example 
of this commitment from the JAC is seen in its first report published in 
2007.229 The JAC stated, “We are fully committed to promoting the 
judiciary’s diversity. Here our work focuses on four areas: gender, 
ethnicity, professional background and stability.”230 The JAC developed a 
strategy to make these ideals a reality. Additionally, it included in its 
Annual Report for 2006/07 a table to show its progress in achieving 
diversity in each of these four areas.231 
In its 2010/11 report - which is the most recent report available at the 
time of writing- the JAC reported on the three groups of people it was 
targeting to be able to attract candidates onto the Bench, that is women, 
black and minority ethnic candidates (hereinafter ‘BME candidates’)232  
and solicitors. On women, the report stated, “The long term analysis 
indicated that women are applying and being selected in increasing 
numbers under the JAC.”233 On the progress on black and ethnic 
minorities, the reports states, “BME lawyers are applying in larger 
numbers, and BME candidates are doing well in selection exercises for 
posts such as Recorder and Deputy District Judge, which are traditionally 
the first step on the judicial ladder. The JAC wants to see BME 
candidates continue to progress through the judiciary.”234 The report was 
not so positive on the progress in getting solicitors to fill in the vacancies 
on the Bench. It states, “Progress has been slower on solicitor 
applications than for women and BME candidates. There has been little 
difference in the proportion of solicitors applying for most roles over the 
past ten years – there have been small increases but no dramatic leap 
forward.”235 To remedy this state of affairs, the JAC noted in its report it 
would take steps to encourage more solicitors to apply for vacancies 
“and support those applying to perform better to their best advantage in 
the selection process.”236 
A report prepared in March 2010 for the Justice Select Committee gave 
an overview of the Constitutional Reform Act, focusing on the different 
  
 228. See Judicial Appointments Commission Annual Report 2006/07 available at 
http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/static/documents/JAC_AR-2006-07.pdf.   
 229. Id. at 10-11. 
 230. Id. at 25. 
 231. See Aggregate Diversity Table of the Seven Exercises in the Annual Report 2006/07 
available at http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/static/documents/AR_2006-07_tables.pdf.  
 232. See Judicial Appointments Commission Annual Report 2010/11- Building the Best 
Judiciary for a Diverse Society, 16, available at 
http://jac.judiciary.gov.uk/static/documents/JAC_Web_cover_2011_Final_New.pdf.  
 233. Id. 
 234. Id. at 17. 
 235. Id. at 18. 
 236. Id. at 18. 
45
31
Thuki: Reform of Judicial Appointments
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
76 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XIX 
areas of reform.237 One of these was the challenges faced by the JAC in 
carrying out its mandate. In particular, one unsuccessful candidate filed a 
case against the JAC arguing that the method of pre-qualifying 
candidates by making them sit for a test was against the principle of 
merit selection. The court dismissed this application and said the JAC 
was at liberty under section 88 of the CRA, 2005 to choose the method 
of pre-qualifying candidates.238 This is just one case I highlight to show 
that even where the method of selecting judges such as using judicial 
commissions, aims to promote fairness and transparency, there will 
inevitably be a disgruntled minority. 
Ultimately both Kenya and England acknowledged the flawed processes 
in selecting and appointing judges. For Kenya, though the Judicial 
Service Commission was institutionalized in the Constitution, it was 
heavily influenced by the Executive appointments to it. This made it easy 
to appoint judges either beholden to the Executive or with the perception 
that they were beholden to the Executive. In essence, it stripped the 
Judiciary of independence. In England the problem was the lack of 
transparency and a skewed view that only people of a certain gender and 
background were appointed judges. There was no diversity. The setting 
up the Judicial Appointments Commission aimed to bring diversity to the 
Bench in England.  Thus, both countries began the journey towards 
transparent appointments to the Bench by the use of judicial councils. 
However, other countries have achieved diversity and a measure of 
transparency by using other methods and not judicial councils. It is these 
methods that are explored in the next chapter. 
V. DISADVANTAGES OF JUDICIAL COMMISSIONS AND 
BENEFITS OF OTHER JUDICIAL SELECTION SYSTEMS  
Zeus made a bull, Prometheus made a man and Athena made a 
house. They invited Momos to judge their handiwork. He was so 
jealous of it that he said that Zeus had made a mistake in not 
putting the bull’s eyes on his horns so that he could see where he 
was butting. Likewise, Prometheus should have attached man’s 
mind [phren] outside his body so that his wicked qualities were 
not hidden but could be there for all to see. As for Athena, he 
told her that she should put wheels on her house so that if an 
undesirable person moved in next door one could move away 
  
 237. See generally Memorandum to the Justice Select Committee-Post Legislative Assessment 
of the Constitutional Reform Act, 2005-March 2010, available at http://www.official-
documents.gov.uk/document/cm78/7814/7814.pdf.  
 238. Id. at 13. 
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easily. Zeus was so enraged by Momo’s jealousy that he 
banished him from Olympus. 
This fable shows nothing is too perfect for criticism.239 
Thus far it has been argued that the merits of judicial councils reflect 
positive changes in judicial appointments in Kenya, as well as in England 
and Wales. But, is this the best way of appointing judges? Does it mean 
that countries that rely on other systems are plagued with unreliable 
judiciaries? This chapter considers other methods of appointing judges 
and argues some alternative selection methods are just as effective. 
Alternative methods include judges choosing judges in Japan, electing 
judges in Bolivia, executive appointments of judges in Algeria and 
legislative appointments in the United States. These four countries 
represent different parts of the world with different judicial systems as a 
means of comparison to see how the various methods work in each 
country. 
A. JUDGES CHOOSING JUDGES – JAPAN 
A judicial role in the selection of judges is often endorsed as a 
step that reinforces the independence of the judiciary.240 
The effectiveness of a judiciary is determined by its independence and 
reliance by the populace, as well as its predictability in making a 
decision.241 David M. O’Brien, a professor and specialist in judicial 
politics writes, “The Japanese judiciary is unitary, unlike the system of 
judicial federalism in Australia, the United States, and elsewhere, with 
both a national judicial system and separate state judiciaries…Japanese 
judges and courts are highly professional and tightly controlled, in 
contrast to the decentralized, relatively non-bureaucratic, and far more 
independent federal courts in the United States.”242 The Japanese method 
for choosing judges at first glance appears insular and subjective, yet 
over the years has stood the test of time and produced an effective 
judiciary.243 
  
 239. OLIVIA & ROBERT TEMPLE, THE COMPLETE FABLES-AESOP 94 (Penguin Group 1998). 
 240. Baar, supra note 6, at 149. 
 241. See generally J. Mark Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, The Case For Managed Judges-
Learning After The Political Upheaval Of 1993, 154 U. OF PA. L. REV. 1879, 1926 (June 2006). 
 242. David M. O’Brien, The Politics of Judicial Selection and Appointments in Japan and Ten 
South and Southeast Asian Countries, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER 355, 
356 (Malleson & Russell eds., 2006). 
 243. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 238, at 1879. 
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The decision to become a judge in Japan begins when a student enrolls at 
the undergraduate level for a degree in law similar to countries where 
students go from high school directly to study law.244  In Japan, after 
undergraduate graduation, all law students take the Japanese bar exam in 
order to gain admission to the Legal Training and Research Institute 
(Shihou Kenshuu Sho Training Institute), which is supervised by the 
Supreme Court of Japan.245 Hon. Sabrina Shizue McKenna, a Hawaii 
Supreme Court justice explains the competitive nature and academic 
rigor of the Japanese bar.  The Bar exam in Japan has an extremely low 
pass rate; in 1991, of the 20,000 who took the exams only 500 passed.246 
Thereafter students must decide whether they want to be attorneys, 
prosecutors or judges.247 Students are compelled to make this decision at 
the infant stage of their careers because the system is so rigid. If they 
choose the judicial path, they must apply to an assistant judicial 
placement. If their application is successful, they are hired for a term of 
ten years. However in practice, assistant judges function like full judges 
after five years.248 
Nevertheless, the inflexible system of choosing which area the Japanese 
lawyer wants to practice immediately after passing the bar exam has 
changed. Shizue McKenna observes that the rigidity about choosing one 
option after the National Bar Exam began to change in the 1990s, and 
attorneys now have the option to be appointed as judges.249 Still, the 
Japanese method produces judges who opt for a career on the bench until 
they reach retirement age primarily because there is not much fluidity in 
moving from the bench to the bar. The rigidity that makes it difficult for 
one to shift from the bench to the bar is not unique to Japan. It is seen in 
civil law countries in Europe and in Asia as well.  This practice is also 
the same for judges in France, Germany, Italy, Austria, Sweden, and 
Korea.250 
The selection panel that admits students into the Shihou Kenshuu Sho 
Training Institute is made up of judges who are supervised by the Chief 
  
 244. O’Brien, supra note 242, at 256. (“Unlike legal education in the United States, but like that 
in Great Britain, Germany and France, students study law as undergraduates and earn a BA in law.”). 
 245. See Hon. Sabrina Shizue McKenna, Proposal for Judicial Reform in Japan: An Overview, 
2 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL’Y J. 121, 124 (July 2001). 
 246. Id. at 124; see also O’Brien, supra note 242, at 356. 
 247. McKenna supra note 245, at 125. 
 248. O’Brien supra note 242, at 357. 
 249. McKenna, supra note 245, at 127. 
 250. McKenna, supra note 245, at 127. 
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Justice.251 The role of this panel, known as the General Secretariat of the 
Supreme Court is not limited to admission, but it also decides in what 
region the judges will work and when they will get promoted.252 Some 
may argue the panel takes the form of a commission because its selection 
process goes beyond choosing students eligible to be judges, but the 
reality is that only judges make decisions about appointment, promotion, 
and other administrative decisions.253 There is no input from other 
sources.  David O’Brien summarizes the Japanese judiciary well when he 
writes: 
From beginning to end, Japanese judicial careers are determined 
by senior judges and judicial peers, not political branches or 
agencies outside courts. As a result, the Japanese judiciary 
maintains its institutional independence and integrity, though at 
the price of conformity and the sacrifice of the independence of 
individual judges on the bench.254 
This system is also likely to subtly influence judges’ decisions since they 
know their judgments have a direct impact on promotions and 
assignments to work in specific parts of the country.255 Therefore, if they 
give a decision deemed to be unfavorable by the panel deciding 
promotions or placements, their promotions may be delayed or they may 
be placed in courts far from their families. 
Some argue that when judges make decisions thinking of the 
consequences to their promotion and placement the outcome is a 
compliant judiciary that is not willing to make decisive actions to check 
excesses of government, which these proponents consider a 
  
 251. See generally Mark Ramseyer, Predicting Court Outcomes Through Political Preferences: 
The Japanese Supreme Court and the Chaos of 1993, 7 THE HARVARD JOHN M. OLIN DISCUSSION 
PAPER SERIES, Discussion Paper No. 624 (2008). 
 252. See Hiroshi Takahashi, Career Patterns of Japanese Judges in Korea and Japan, in 
JUDICIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE GLOBALIZING WORLD 189-190 (Dai-Kwon Choi & Kahei 
Rokumoto eds., 2007). 
 253. Id. at 64. 
 254. O’Brien, supra note 242, at 360. 
 255. See generally Mark Ramseyer & Eric Rasmusen, Managed Courts Under Unstable 
Political Environments: Recruitment and Resignations in the 1990s Japanese Judiciary, HARV. L. & 
ECON. RESEARCH PAPER SERIES, Discussion Paper No. 571, 4 (2006). (explaining that “[g]enerally, 
the Secretariat used its control over judicial careers to reward efficient performance – to judges who 
decided cases expeditiously and predictably. Occasionally, however, it used it to induce judges to 
implement the political preferences of the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP). In the 
occasionally politically charged case, if a judge tried to implement of out-of-power parties the 
Secretariat sometimes derailed his career. More generally, if favored the careers of right-leaning 
judges over the leftist. During the 1960s a large number of jurists associated with the communist 
affiliated Young Jurist League joined the courts. Over the next few decades, the Secretariat imposed 
on them significant career penalties.”). 
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disadvantage.256 Others argue there are merits to the system of 
appointments because it encourages homogeneity in decisions and 
increases public trust if the parties are able to predict the outcome of a 
case.257 In assessing the system, it is important to bear in mind the 
influence of Japanese culture, which is more inclined to look for ways to 
dissolve the dispute instead of litigating.258 
In Japan, the conclusion is that judges choosing judges is a method that 
has proved useful.259 Proponents of this appointment system argue that 
judges know best the qualities to look for in applicants.260 They also 
understand rigors of judicial work better, and consequently, are at an 
advantage when it comes to choosing who would make a good fit within 
the institution.261 But ultimately the system of judges choosing judges is 
about control because the General Secretariat of the Supreme Court 
controls who joins the bench and ultimately who becomes a judge.262 
The same system was partially used in England and Wales by the Lord 
Chancellor in “secret soundings.”263 These soundings consisted of 
consultations with different people who might weigh in on the 
matter.264265 
However since 2003, there have been developments to adapt a model 
based on a judicial council.266 In 1999, the Justice System Reform 
Council was established to consider wide range of reforms needed for the 
justice system.267 It came up with a proposal to have an “Advisory 
Committee for the Nomination of Judges for the appointment or 
reappointment” of judges to all courts except the Supreme Court.268 It is 
made up of eleven members, five who are appointed from three groups 
  
 256. Takahashi, supra note 252, at 64; cf. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note #252, at 1. 
(comparing judges in U.S. federal courts with managed courts like the ones in Japan and posit that 
their political preferences have no influence on their jobs, therefore they have a great deal of 
independence since they know their decisions on the Bench have no consequences to their personal 
or professional life). 
 257. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 255, at 8. 
 258. Takahashi, supra note 252, at 41-44. 
 259. Ramseyer & Rasmusen, supra note 241, at 1929-1930. 
 260. Id. at 1888-1890. 
 261. Id. at 1890. 
 262. O’Brien, supra note 242, at 360. 
 263. Maute, supra note 83, at 396-397. 
 264. Oliver, supra note 141, at 103. 
 265. Oliver, supra note 141, at 104.  
 266. KAHEI ROKUMOTO, Justice System In Japan: Its Background And Processes in Korea and 
Japan, in JUDICIAL TRANSFORMATION IN THE GLOBALIZING WORLD 319 (Dai-Kwon Choi & Kahei 
Rokumoto eds., 2007). 
 267. Id.  
 268. Id. at 343. 
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of legal professions in Japan - judges, attorneys, and prosecutors.269  The 
other six members appointed are, “law professors and other persons with 
relevant knowledge and experience.”270 
The function of this committee is to consider the list of names presented 
by the Supreme Court for appointment to the bench.271 This consideration 
includes collecting background information on the candidates and 
making inquiries from the relevant bodies.272 The Committee then makes 
a recommendation to the Supreme Court on the suitability of the 
candidate for the bench.273 These changes were introduced to address the 
shortcomings of the traditional system of appointment, as well as to 
inject objectivity and transparency.274 
B. ELECTING JUDGES – BOLIVIA  
Another way of choosing judges, though not very popular, is by election. 
275
 In this system, judges run for office the same way politicians run. 
They get votes from the electorate who cast ballots in favor of the 
candidate they would like to be a judge.276 The judicial candidate 
campaigns exactly the same way a politician does by spending money on 
advertising and portraying other judicial aspirants negatively.277 More 
than a decade ago, scholar T. Leigh Anenson persuasively argued that 
Latin American countries should adopt the electoral method of judicial 
selection as part of overall judicial reform.278 She claimed that, 
“[E]lection is congruent with an attempt ‘to integrate the judiciary into… 
[Latin American] life’ as well as the promise to ‘maintain an open-
minded approach both internally and towards the rest of society’.”279 
Anenson asserted that the advantages of selection by election are 
  
 269. Id.  
 270. Id. 
 271. Id.  
 272. Id. at 344; see also Takayuki Ii, Japanese Way of Judicial Appointment and Its Impact on 
Judicial Review, 5.2 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 95-97 (2010) available at 
http://www.law.ntu.edu.tw/ntulawreview/articles/5-2/03-Article-Takayuki%20Ii.pdf.  The criterion 
used varies based on the category of judge that is appointed and includes grades and reports from the 
General Secretariat and Regional Committees.  
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 342. The process of appointing judges since the reform is more transparent. 
 275. See James Sample et al., The New Politics of Judicial Selections 2000-2009: Decade of 
Change, BRENNAN CENTER FOR JUSTICE 1 (Aug. 2010), available at 
http://brennan.3cdn.net/d091dc911bd67ff73b_09m6yvpgv.pdf.  
 276. Id. at 12. 
 277. See Adam Liptak, Rendering Justice with One Eye on Re-Election, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/25/us/25exception.html?pagewanted=print.  
 278. T. Leigh Anenson, For Whom The Bell Tolls…Judicial Selection By Election In Latin 
America, 4 SW. J. OF L. & TRADE IN THE AMERICAS (now called SW. J. INT’L LAW) 261, 277 (Fall 
1997). 
 279. Id. at 296. 
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freedom from political influence since the people choose judges directly 
and the desire or ability of judges elected to adapt the law to local 
conditions, as well as an increase in public confidence in the judiciary as 
a whole.280 
In October 2011, for the first time in history, the people of Bolivia 
elected judges by ballot.281 This was the sole method used in the election.  
Unprecedented in Bolivia, the selection of judges was the people’s 
choice.282 One report stated the government settled for this method “as a 
bold step to hold judges more accountable and improve the judicial 
system.”283 Another report described the election of judges in Bolivia as 
“rough justice” and the “wrong way to reform the judiciary.”284 
The report describing the judicial election as “rough justice” was heavily 
criticized in a response by one civil society non-profit organization.285 In 
response to the criticism leveled at the manner of judicial determination, 
another non-profit organization justified electing judges by explaining 
that it was a difficult duty to install a new judicial system and the system 
needed protection from interference.286 
In fact there were positive results from the election.   One such example 
was the election of Judge Cristina Mamani, who has since been elected 
by her peers to head the Judicial Council.287 Mamani is from an 
indigenous Bolivian group and won the election after receiving more 
than 450,000 votes, the highest any candidate in the election received.288  
In addition, “Of the 56 newly-elected judges, 50% are women and 40% 
  
 280. Id. at 283-293. 
 281. See Gabriel Elizondo, Bolivians Vote to De-Colonize Courts, AL JAZEERA, Oct. 16, 2011, 
available at http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2011/10/201110169924243497.html.    
 282. Elizondo, supra note # 292. 
 283. See Gabriel Elizondo, Bolivia Set to Hold Judicial Ballot, AL JAZEERA, Oct. 16, 2011, 
available at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/americas/2011/10/20111016184836437398.html; See 
also Bolivia: Judicial Elections, NETHERLANDS AID, Dec. 22, 2011, available at http://www.nl-
aid.org/continent/latin-america/bolivia-judicial-elections/.  
 284. See generally Rough Justice: The Wrong Way to Reform the Courts, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 
7, 2012, available at http://www.economist.com/node/21542421. 
 285. See Economist Wrongly Reads “Rough Justice” into Bolivian Judicial Reforms, ANDIAN 
INFORMATION NETWORK, Jan. 10, 2012, available at http://ain-bolivia.org/2012/01/economist-
wrongly-reads-%E2%80%9Crough-justice%E2%80%9D-into-bolivian-judicial-reforms/.  
 286. Id.  
 287. See Emily Achtenberg, Bolivia’s New Faces of Justice, REBEL CURRENTS, Jan. 13, 2012, 
available at http://upsidedownworld.org/main/news-briefs-archives-68/3405-bolivias-new-faces-of-
justice.   
 288. See Indigenous Woman Attorney is Bolivia’s First President of its New Magistrates 
Council, INDIAN COUNTRY, Jan. 12, 2012, available at http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ 
2012/01/21/indigenous-woman-attorney-is-bolivia%E2%80%99s-first-president-of-its-new-
magistrates-council-73588.   
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are indigenous.”289 It is progress to have a woman from an indigenous 
community on the bench because it reflects the view that diversity on the 
bench can be achieved in other ways apart from a judicial council. 
A similar process of choosing judges by election is used in the United 
States but varies from one state to another.290 New York is one example 
of a state that holds judicial elections.291 In 1973 and 1974, contentious 
elections were held for the position of the Chief Judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the highest court in New York.292 The Institute of Judicial 
Administration documented these elections.293 In 1973 one of the 
candidates who offered himself for election was not from the bench. His 
name was Jacob Fuchsberg, and “he was the only nonjudge and had been 
opposed not only by his declared opponents, but also by the New York 
State Bar Association and the Association of the Bar of the City of New 
York.”294 
The authors characterized the election as bitter and highlighted the 
negative aspects of using elections as a way of choosing judges.295 
Particularly, the authors cited the fact that politics is one of several 
negative features surrounding judicial elections.  Moreover, other 
negative aspects included the lack of bar association influence in 
elections, personal financial contributions of candidates to fund their 
election campaigns, and the fact that public sentiment of candidates is 
based on which candidate is able to successfully sell themselves to the 
voters, not on who is actually the best candidate for the position.296 The 
  
 289. Supra note 285.  
 290. See Fact Sheet on Judicial Selections Methods in the States, AMERICAN BAR 
ASSOCIATION, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/leadership/fact_ 
sheet.authcheckdam.pdf (explaining a breakdown on election methods in the different states). 
 291. See generally Judicial Selection in the States: New York, AMERICAN JUDICATURE 
SOCIETY, http://www.judicialselection.us/judicial_selection/index.cfm?state=NY.  
 292. See CYNTHIA OWEN PHILIP ET AL., WHERE DO JUDGES COME FROM? ii (1976) (“The 
general election campaign was even more bitter than the primary. Judge Breitel and Mr. Fuchsberg 
each expressed increasingly hostile views about his opponent’s campaign.”). 
 293. PHILIP ET AL., id at i – iv.  
 294. PHILIP ET AL., id at ii. 
 295. Id.; see also JOANNE MARTIN, MERIT SELECTION COMMISSIONS: WHAT DO THEY DO? 
HOW EFFECTIVE ARE THEY? 3 (1993) (“The traditional arguments supporting the concept of merit 
selection focus on the problems of judicial elections. Judicial elections tend to draw low voter 
turnout and limited media attention. As a result, the quality and quantity of information available to 
the public concerning the individuals on the ballot are problematic. Candidates may thus be elected 
based on name recognition (or ethnic allegiance), personality or party affiliation, rather than on the 
basis of their ability to perform judicial duties. Additionally, elections – especially partisan elections 
– may lead well-qualified individuals to decline becoming candidates due to their concern about the 
nature of politics involved and the demands of political campaigning. The pressures of campaigning, 
fund-raising, and eliciting support from various political groups are not only burdensome, but may 
also put candidates under pressure to undertake favors for the groups from which they seek support. 
Also having to run for office takes time away from judicial duties for those already on the bench.”). 
 296. PHILIP ET AL., supra note 292, at iii-iv; see also Kendall, supra note 208, at 211-231. 
49
39
Thuki: Reform of Judicial Appointments
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
84 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XIX 
writers concluded by arguing against the election primarily because of 
political interference as well as the lack of information provided to the 
voters during election.297 The issue of judicial elections in the Court of 
Appeals in New York was re-visited in the United States Supreme Court 
case, New York State Board of Elections v. Lopez Torres.298 
In my view, regardless of the jurisdiction, this method of selecting judges 
will always be the method that attracts the most criticism because it is 
expensive and diminishes the credibility of judges as independent.299 
Unlike in a political contest, the public does not know much about the 
judges they are electing. In addition, judges have to go out to the people 
and campaign, which requires money. Some of those likely to fund 
judges’ campaigns may do so in hopes that a favor will be returned when 
their case is placed before the judge. They anticipate the judgment will 
be in their favor regardless of the merits of the case. This erodes 
independence of the judiciary, which is a critical feature in the 
dispensation of justice. 
C. EXECUTIVE APPOINTMENTS – ALGERIA  
Globally, direct executive appointments are rare. Most appointments 
have a component that includes a pseudo-judicial council that makes a 
recommendation on who should become a judge; the final decision is 
made by elsewhere, usually by the executive. This was the case in Kenya 
with the composition of the pre-2010 JSC. As discussed above, the 
President appointed members of the JSC and thus had an invisible hand 
in the appointment process.  
However, in Algeria this is not the case. The Algerian President sits as 
the chair of the Supreme Judicial Council that determines judicial 
appointments, while the vice president of the judicial council is reserved 
for the Algerian Minister for Justice.300 Judges and magistrates do not 
have the security of tenure.  Moreover, even though the Algerian 
  
 297. PHILIP ET AL., supra note 292, at iv; see also Kendall, supra note 208, at 217.  (considering 
the possibility of Canada selecting judges by election but ultimately dismisses the notion) (“There 
are problems with an elected judiciary, however. Morally the objection, as stated by Jeremy Webber, 
is that the ‘[e]lection [of judges], it is believed, is incompatible with their role as a bulwark against 
majoritarian excesses, concerned more with protecting individual interests than with pursuing 
common goals.’ It is also alleged that elections are generally seen as demeaning to the candidates 
and therefore less likely to attract the qualified members of the Bar.”). 
 298. N.Y. State Bd. of Elections vs. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196 (2008). 
 299. Adam Skaggs et al., The New Politics of Judicial Elections 2000-2009, available at 
http://newpoliticsreport.org/site/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/JAS-NewPolitics2010-Online-
Imaged.pdf.  
 300. See generally UNDP Programme on Governance in the Arab Region, Country focus on 
Algeria, available at http://arabstates.undp.org/rbas/en/home.html.  
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Constitution recognizes the independence of the judiciary, in practice this 
does not happen.301 The President derives his power to head the Supreme 
Judicial Council from the Algerian Constitution. Indirectly, he then has 
the powers to assign, promote, and transfer judges.  
In this arrangement, judicial officers are beholden to the executive 
branch while appointments and dismissals are based on political 
expediency instead of merit.302 One of the many consequences of this 
arrangement is that the rights of individuals are crushed, and 
consequently the notion of a fair trial disappears.303 There are very few 
countries in the world that adhere to this system, where there is direct 
involvement by executives in the judiciary without any forms of checks 
and balances.304  
There are several reasons why there is absolutely no advantage to 
selecting judges and magistrates in this way. First, judges will have no 
confidence from the public.  Second, judicial officers will make 
decisions based on fear, timidity or in favor of the Executive because of 
the Executive’s power over them, and therefore trample the rights of the 
individual.305 Alternatively, judges will resort to taking bribes and 
kickbacks from parties in their courts such that justice will be for sale to 
the highest bidder.306 This is a truly unsatisfactory arrangement because it 
makes the judiciary subservient to the whims of the executive and strips 
away any form of independence from judges. 
D. LEGISLATIVE APPOINTMENTS– SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED 
STATES 
The appointment process for justices to sit on the Supreme Court of the 
United States involves confirmation by the Senate.307 This process 
attracts countrywide attention because of the power these judges wield, 
as well as the fact that sitting on the Supreme Court is a lifetime 
  
 301. See International Commission of Jurists Report on Algeria. 
 302. See generally Amel Boubekeur, Countries at the Crossroads 2011 – Algeria, FREEDOM 
HOUSE, Nov. 10, 2011, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,FREEHOU,,DZA,,4ecba654c,0.html.  
 303. International Commission of Jurists Report on Algeria, supra note # 297. 
 304. See generally Attacks on Justice-People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria, International 
Commission of Jurists 2-3, available at 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,ICJURISTS,,DZA,,48a3f0280,0.html. 
 305. Id. at 5. 
 306. Id. at 5. 
 307. U.S. CONST. ART. II, § 2. 
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appointment.308 The appointment process is established in Article II of 
the United States Constitution and gives the President power to nominate 
judges to the Supreme Court “by and with the advice and consent of the 
Senate.”309 Thus, the Senate plays an important role in the appointment 
process. If members of the Senate decline to approve the President’s 
nominee, the Senate Judiciary Committee should then give additional 
information.310 Out of 154 nominations received, 120 have been 
confirmed.311 Researcher Denis Steven Rutkus observes:  
[P]olitics also has played an important role in Supreme Court 
appointments. The political nature of the appointment process 
becomes especially apparent when a President submits a 
nominee with controversial views, there are sharp partisan or 
ideological differences between the President and the Senate, or 
the outcome of important constitutional issues before the Court 
is seen to be at stake.312 
A good example of this is the Senate’s role in the nomination of Robert 
Bork. Robert Bork had all the qualities of a justice worthy of sitting on 
the Supreme Court.313 President Reagan nominated Bork on July 1, 
1987.314 However, in October 1987 the Senate rejected Bork’s 
nomination after five days of confirmation hearings in a vote where 42 
voted for Bork’s confirmation while 58 voted against it.315  This was not 
the first time the Senate rejected a President’s Supreme Court nominee, 
but it is the largest margin to date that a nominated candidate has lost.316 
This rejection, in addition to the fact that Bork was highly qualified, 
makes the Senate’s role in Supreme Court judicial determination the 
focus of attention.317 
There were many factors surrounding Reagan’s nomination of Bork. 
These included Reagan’s own views about packing the Court with 
conservative Judges and the reality that the Republicans no longer held a 
majority in the Judiciary Committee, as well as the Iran-Contra 
  
 308. See generally Denis Steven Rutkus, Cong. Research Serv., RL31989, Supreme Court 
Appointment Process: Roles of the President, Judiciary Committee and Senate (2005), available at 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/50146.pdf. 
 309. Id. at 2. 
 310. Id. at 45-48. 
 311. Id. at 2. 
 312. Id.  
 313. See generally Mary Katherine Boyte, The Supreme Court Confirmation Process in Crisis: 
Is the System Defective, or Merely the Participants?, 14 WHITTIER L. REV. 517, 537 (1993). 
 314. Id. at 524. 
 315. Id. at 523. 
 316. Id.  
 317. Id. at 521-522, 531. 
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Scandal.318 Furthermore, the media, for the first time played a significant 
role in the public’s perception of a Supreme Court nominee, as Bork’s 
confirmation hearings were aired, (in come cases live) on national 
television.319 
No one questioned Bork’s credentials, but the schisms between the 
political parties led to his rejection as a nominee.320 Professor Ronald D. 
Rotunda predicted Supreme Court Justice nominees are likely to be 
caught in the cross hairs of both political parties.321 He stated: 
What may become a legacy of the nomination of Robert Bork is 
the tendency to treat a confirmation as if it were an election 
campaign, a media event complete with an avalanche of stump 
speeches and a bombardment of negative advertising, all 
accompanied by extensive direct mail advertising, campaign 
buttons, and solicitation of funds. A bipartisan task 
force…concluded that the Supreme Court confirmation hearings 
are “too visible and attract too much publicity,” and that these 
hearings are used “for other purposes, ranging from self-
promotion to mobilizing special-interest groups in order to 
influence public opinion.322 
Senate involvement in the nomination process of Supreme Court Justices 
may have influenced the development of the nomination process of 
Supreme Court Judges in the United Kingdom.323 Due to the fact that the 
United States Senate can have such a powerful influence on nominations 
to the United States Supreme Court, the United Kingdom chose to 
implement a different process where the House of Commons is not at all 
involved in the process of choosing Judges in the United Kingdom. 324 
In my view, the history of the United States, along with robust provisions 
in the United States Constitution and heavy adherence to having a system 
of checks and balances, makes it possible to have the Senate involved in 
the nomination process of United States Supreme Court Justices (though 
there is room for improvement).325 The United Kingdom observed the 
United States’ process of Supreme Court nominations, particularly the 
  
 318. Id. at 517. 
 319. Id. at 527; See also Ronald Rotunda, Separation of Powers: The Confirmation Process for 
Supreme Court Justices in the Modern Era, 37 EMORY L. J. 559, 581 (1988). 
 320. Boyte, supra note 313, at 546. 
 321. Rotunda, supra note 319, at 585. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Clark, supra note 136, at 485. 
 324. Id. 
 325. Boyte, supra note 313, at 542-546. 
51
43
Thuki: Reform of Judicial Appointments
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
88 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XIX 
polarized debates surrounding Bork’s nomination, and made the decision 
to exclude its legislature in the appointment of Judges.326 
In a fragile democracy, such as Kenya, where appointments tend to be 
viewed through ethnic lenses, legislative appointments of judges would 
be extremely difficult, and instead of uniting the country, may heighten 
ethnic tensions. However, the 2010 Kenyan Constitution does have a 
limited legislative role in the appointment of the Chief Justice and the 
Deputy Chief Justice.327 The role of the legislature (referred to as the 
National Assembly) is to act as a balance ensuring the President does not 
bypass the JSC or wield control over it, which in turn ensures that 
Presidential appointments are fair.328 
However, does appointment by the legislature ultimately guarantee that 
judges are accountable and independent? Looking at the history of the 
Supreme Court of the United States, the answer is yes. In general, 
Supreme Court Judges make decisions based on fidelity to the law.  In 
the final assessment, judicial appointments by the legislature can bring 
positive results. The major disadvantage is that the judicial appointment 
process can be hijacked by political influence and other considerations, 
which have nothing to do with the competence of the candidate.  But this 
method is still preferred above executive appointments and appointments 
by elections because it achieves both independence of the judiciary and 
acceptance of appointments by the people. 
VI. LESSONS LEARNED AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Many lessons can be learnt from the ways in which commissions 
operate in other systems, but it is neither necessary nor desirable 
to follow slavishly the detailed arrangements found elsewhere.329 
If it were possible to have trends in the selection of judges, the latest 
trend would be selection by using judicial commissions. On balance, 
judicial commissions appear to be the most effective tool at creating 
diversity on the bench, reducing political influence on selection, and 
instilling confidence from the public about the independence of the 
judiciary.  The Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) in England has 
been at work for more than five years, since April 2006, while the 
  
 326. Clark, supra note # 136, at 478. 
 327. CONSTITUTION, art.166 § 1(a) (2010) (Kenya) (“The President shall appoint (a) the Chief 
Justice and the Deputy Chief Justice, in accordance with the recommendation of the Judicial Service 
Commission, and subject to the approval of the National Assembly…”). 
 328. See CONSTITUTION, art. 166 § 1(a) (2010) (Kenya). 
 329. Malleson, supra note 15, at 102-103. 
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Judicial Service Commission (JSC) in Kenya is a year old. Thus, the JSC 
should draw lessons from the JAC and other judicial commissions 
worldwide. This chapter considers lessons the JSC can draw from the 
JAC and then proceed to look for lessons from other sources, but these 
do not represent an exhaustive list. In addition, most of the 
recommendations below can be implemented by the JSC without 
legislative amendment, yet a few recommendations require legislative 
amendment. 
A. LESSONS FROM THE JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS COMMISSION (JAC) 
The first lesson the JSC should incorporate is publication of an annual 
report similar to the JAC’s annual report. The report should include 
information such as goals the JSC sets out to achieve and whether it was 
able to achieve these goals. This would fulfill the preexisting 
requirement that the JSC release an annual report. The report should also 
include an analysis of judicial positions advertised and a categorization 
of candidates based on gender, current field of practice and locality 
where they work without the mention of names, as well as candidates 
who were short-listed and those who were successful in interviews. The 
report should also contain highlights of achievements of the JSC within 
the past year and the challenges it faced, as well as proposals on how to 
overcome those challenges.  Since the JSC not only hires, but also 
disciplines it would be good to have a brief analysis of the complaints it 
received and how these were resolved. This should be done for both 
judicial officers and the rest of the judicial staff without mentioning 
names in the report.330 Additionally, the report should include guidance 
on how to lodge a complaint, which could be included in the back of the 
report. Moreover, hard copies of the report should be made available in 
every courthouse in Kenya to be kept in court libraries. For courts that do 
not have libraries, the JSC report should be in the custody of a judicial 
employee at the court who will make it accessible for public use on 
request. Finally, a hard copy of the report should be available for sale at 
an affordable cost to other governmental organs and stakeholders, as well 
as any interested person who wants to know more about how judges are 
selected in Kenya. 
In order to avoid any conflicts of interest, my second proposal, 
specifically aimed at lawyers, judges, and magistrates appointed as JSC 
  
 330. Cf. State of California’s Commission on Judicial Performance, available at 
http://cjp.ca.gov/ (reports published online and mention the names of the judges and the disciplinary 
action taken against them). 
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commissioners, is to run a conflict of interest check regularly.331 On a 
practical level, one suggestion is for the JSC to “discuss conflict of 
interest problems thoroughly to determine which specific relationships 
cause concern.”332 Conflicts of interest arise when any of the 
commissioner’s relationships (in the personal, professional, or political 
sphere) appear to influence or in fact influence the commissioner’s 
ability to make a decision based solely on an applicant’s merit.333 
Currently, there is no policy in place, but the JSC must fully address 
conflicts issues to make it clear to JSC lawyers when and in what 
circumstances they either need to recuse themselves or disclose 
information to fellow commissioners.334 For example, one proposal 
would be to prevent a commissioner from taking part in the deliberations 
if they have any pending matters before the applicant who is a judicial 
officer.335 
My third proposal is on how to address the removal of commissioners, a 
legislative requirement since it affects the content of the Judicial Service 
Act that governs the JSC.336 In the excitement to form the JSC, the 
Judicial Services Act left out one important clause. It is silent on the 
removal of a commissioner from the JSC. This leaves the JSC vulnerable 
to excesses of power as the executive branch of government was in the 
1963 Constitution. Of course, it is expected that commissioners have 
been chosen by their respective bodies and in the case of the laypersons 
nominated by the President; the National Assembly thoroughly 
scrutinized them. However, there is no clause addressing the removal of 
the commissioners.  
In the Constitutional Reform Act (CRA), JAC commissioners can either 
resign or be removed from office on recommendation from the Lord 
Chancellor.337 The grounds on which the Lord Chancellor can make his 
recommendations include the failure to conduct duties as a 
commissioner, conviction of an offence, bankruptcy, and being unfit to 
hold office.338 My recommendation is that the Judicial Service Act of 
2011 be amended to include grounds for a commissioner’s removal. The 
  
 331. Marla N. Greestein, Handbook for Judicial Nominating Commissioners, THE AMERICAN 
JUDICATURE SOCIETY 6 (2004), available at http://www.ajs.org/selection/ 
jnc/docs/JNC_HandbkCh1.pdf.  
 332. Id. at 6. 
 333. Id.  
 334. Id. at 7. 
 335. Id. at 8. 
 336. See generally The Judicial Service Act, No. 1 (2011), KENYA GAZETTE SUPPLEMENT NO. 
17 (Kenya).  
 337. The Constitutional Review Act, 2005, c. 83, §15, sch. 12 (U.K.)  
 338. Id. 
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current position in the Judicial Service Act is that there are no grounds 
for removal of a commissioner, so there is need for legislative 
amendment to include specific grounds for removal. 
My fourth proposal is the auditing of complaints filed by the JSC by the 
Kenyan Judicial Ombudsman. I draw this lesson from the Commission 
for Judicial Appointments (hereinafter CJA), the precursor to the JAC, 
which had a five-year mandate beginning in 2001 because it, “served as 
an independent watchdog entity, auditing the appointment process and 
investigating complaints about the process and fairness issues arising in 
specific appointments.”339 Indeed, the CJA produced a scathing report 
after reviewing a selection process using “secret soundings” of the Lord 
Chancellor.340 In Kenya, the Judicial Ombudsman is not independent 
enough because it is an office within the judiciary, hence the process of 
overseeing and evaluating the appointments should be assigned to 
another independent entity that will carry out this process for a specific 
period of time, between five and seven years.  
B. LESSONS FROM AROUND THE WORLD 
The JSC should be more transparent about its hiring processes and set 
out a time schedule on the period it takes to fill vacancies in the 
judiciary.341 For example, in this writer’s experience it took about 180 
days from my submission of magistrate application in response to an 
advertisement of vacancies until receiving an offer letter.  This occurred 
during the pre-2010 JSC.   
The post-2010 JSC has proved itself more adept at advertising, 
shortlisting, interviewing, and identifying candidates to fill vacant posts 
for judicial officers. Admittedly, most of the posts it has filled are for 
judges, but it has handled a larger volume of interested candidates for 
these positions than its predecessor, and credit must be given for its 
efficiency.   
However, a cautionary note should be made for the shortlisting process 
due to conclusions drawn from appointments made in 2011. In April 
2011, the JSC advertised 28 vacancies for judges and received 234 
  
 339. Maute, supra note 83, at 405-406. 
 340. See generally Judging the Judicial Process, THE LAWYER, April 10, 1999, available at 
http://www.thelawyer.com/judging-the-judicial-selection-process/88799.article.  
 341. Martin, supra note 295, at 8. 
53
47
Thuki: Reform of Judicial Appointments
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
92 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XIX 
applications.342 Of the qualified magistrates who applied, there was 
biased selection in short-listing either based on age, years of experience 
within the judiciary, or rank within the magistracy.343 While I agree that 
the JSC should not openly subvert the Constitution or exercise any form 
of discrimination, it must level the playing field to shortlist and appoint 
(if the candidates demonstrate ability) youthful judges.  
Similar facts apply in the selection of Court of Appeal judges. A variety 
of candidates applied, yet all selected to the Court of Appeal were High 
Court judges.344 It is easy to conclude that the JSC wanted to elevate 
judges from within to the Court of Appeal but had to be seen as fair in 
this process. In order to live up to the phrase, “The Judicial Service 
Commission is an Equal Opportunity Employer and selects candidates on 
merit, through fair and open competition, from the widest range of 
eligible candidates,”345 the JSC must ensure shortlisting and ultimate 
selection of judges and magistrates are not motivated by other factors. 
Drawn from the Bolivian experience detailed previously in this article, 
the JSC must guard itself against manipulation by the legislative and 
executive branches. As noted in previous chapters, judicial councils 
minimize the influence of politics in selecting judges.346 While the 
influence is not totally eradicated in any judicial council, it is kept at a 
minimum. This is an important consideration because it was the political 
influence through the executive branch (in the person of the President) 
that contributed significantly to the perception that the judiciary is an 
extension of the executive office in Kenya. In England and Wales, JAC 
commissioners are interviewed by a separate body as part of a very 
competitive and thorough process.  
  
 342. Nzau Musau, Shortlisting Complete for Advertised Judges’ Positions, THE STAR, May 28, 
2011, available at http://www.the-star.co.ke/national/national/26060-shortlisting-complete-for-
advertised-judges-positions.  
 343. There are different ranks that include District Magistrate (Prof.) II, Resident Magistrate, 
Senior Resident Magistrate, Principal Magistrate, Senior Principle Magistrate and Chief Magistrate. 
All ranks have a different civil and criminal jurisdiction and salary as well. See generally the 
Magistrates’ Courts Act, (2007) Cap. 10 § 5(1) (Kenya), available at 
http://www.kenyalaw.org/Downloads/GreyBook/5.%20The%20Magistrates%20Courts%20Act.pdf.  
 344. See Wahome Thuku, Kenya Chief Justice Nominates Judges, THE STANDARD, December 
10, 2011, available at http://in2eastafrica.net/kenyas-chief-justice-nominates-judges/. (“The JSC did 
not pick any of the other 11 lawyers in private practice and from the academia that had been short-
listed.”). 
 345. The phrase appeared at the bottom of the advertisement of Court of Appeal judges on 
October 4, 2011. Vacancy in the Office of Judge of the Court of Appeal, No. 8 (2011), KENYA 
GAZETTE NO. 13479, available at http://www.kenyalaw.org/klr/index.php?id=880.  
 346. Kendall, supra note 208, at 222. (quoting J. Ziegel) (“It has great attractions. It largely 
depoliticizes the selection process but still leaves a role for the government to play.”). 
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The process of selecting some JSC commissioners in Kenya is 
competitive. JSC members come from different “constituencies,” which 
include the Kenyan judiciary, the Law Society of Kenya, and members 
of the public. The Attorney General is the only direct Presidential 
appointee. The two lay persons, even though nominated by the President, 
must be approved by the legislature. Thus, there is an element of 
objectivity introduced for lay members who are Presidential nominees.  
The way in which political influence may creep in is through the election 
of lawyers by their own members. This may happen through politicians 
seeking to ensure that a lawyer sympathetic to their cause is elected to 
the JSC by bribing some lawyers so they elect the politician’s choice for 
the JSC. Though the possibility is remote, it is still worth bearing in 
mind.347 The recommendation is for JSC commissioners to be aware of 
the invisible hand of political influence in their midst. 
The JSC must also learn that it is the next target in reform.  Nuno 
Garoupa and Tom Ginsburg write, “The councils, once created, provide 
an arena for competition and the eternal struggle to calibrate 
independence and accountability. We thus predict that councils 
themselves will frequently become the targets of institutional reform . . . 
.”
348
 The inference is that there has been a shift from reform of the 
judiciary to the reformation of judicial councils.  
Furthermore, the JSC ought to decide in its recruitment policies whether 
it shall adopt a passive or active approach in diversifying the bench. The 
passive approach would allow non-traditional candidates to apply to join 
the bench. Evidence thus far in selecting judges for the Kenyan bench 
shows that more and more candidates from diverse backgrounds and 
different parts of the country are applying to be judges. This evidence is 
attributable to the fact that candidates feel there is a better chance they 
will be considered fairly since the mechanism of appointment is 
transparent. There are heightened numbers of female lawyers applying, 
as well as lawyers who practice outside of Nairobi, Mombasa, and 
Kisumu which are Kenya’s main cities.  In the pre-2010 JSC, women and 
upcountry lawyers would not have had an opportunity at all. The active 
approach is for the JSC to have a more dynamic method of selection, 
targeting groups that have been left out. However, in a country where 
specific ethnic identity dominates over one’s national Kenyan identity, 
this is problematic, because it could lead to accusations of the JSC 
promoting a particular ethnic group.   
  
 347. Martin, supra note 295, at 20-23. 
 348. Garoupa & Ginsburg, supra note # 8, at 130.  
54
49
Thuki: Reform of Judicial Appointments
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2013
94 ANNUAL SURVEY OF INT’L & COMP. LAW [Vol. XIX 
Overall, the ‘trickle up’ approach is most likely. This approach is similar 
to the approach that occurred in the 1960s in the form of Africanization 
that will happen now with diversity.349 Africanization refers to the 
process by which Kenyans became members of the bar by studying law 
at a university, going through law school, sitting for the bar exam, and 
taking the oath to practice law. By independence in 1963, the Kenyan bar 
(and bench) was predominantly an all white male affair. But where the 
JSC can re-dress some of the inequalities as it did in its appointment of 
five women (out of seven candidates) to the Court of Appeal in 
December 2011, it should.350 
But what happens if the JSC makes a recommendation that is rejected by 
the National Assembly? This happened in England when the Lord 
Chancellor rejected JAC nominees.351 The mandate for the JSC as 
outlined in the Constitution of 2010 is to make recommendations for the 
position of Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice. In its first year of 
operation, the National Assembly endorsed all JSC appointments. 
However, the JSC ought to consider what strategy it shall adapt in the 
event that its recommendations are rejected. This happened in Canada 
when its commission failed to include a Franco-phone speaking judge, as 
well as in South Africa when a white candidate was overlooked in favor 
of a black candidate.352 Both nominations were rejected. 
It is likely that a point of contention in Kenya will be the ethnicity of 
candidates. If it is seen that there are more judges from one particular 
ethnic group, it is probable that the JSC may come under fire.  In the 
words of Francois du Bois, the JSC will learn what the South African 
JSC learned.  “[H]ard choices have to be made between diversity and 
representivity, and between lawyerly excellence and social 
legitimacy.”353 
  
 349. Malleson & Russell, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER supra note 15, 
at 8. 
 350. Prior to this, there had been no woman on the Court of Appeal’s bench from January 2009, 
and the only female judge was appointed to an international court. There were appointments made to 
the Court of Appeal in April 2009, but the appointments were given to two men. 
 351. See generally Joshua Rozenburg, Lord Chancellor Veto Raises Questions for Judicial 
Standards, THE GUARDIAN, December 8, 2011, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/law/ 
2011/dec/08/lord-chancellor-veto-judicial-standards. (includes an ongoing discussion on the powers 
of the Lord Chancellor); See also Kate Malleson, Taking The Politics Out Of Judicial Appointments, 
UK CONSTITUTIONAL LAW GROUP (February 21, 2012), http://ukconstitutionallaw.org/ 
2012/02/21/kate-malleson-taking-the-politics-out-of-judicial-appointments/. 
 352. Malleson & Russell, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER supra note 15, 
at 47; See also Du Bois, supra note # 11, at 291. 
 353. Du Bois, supra note # 11, at 283. 
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Should the JSC defend its position on prior recommendations for judges 
to the Supreme Court of Kenya? This is water under the bridge since 
Supreme Court judges are now in office, but it is worth revisiting 
because there are lessons to learn for the future. The Chief Justice and 
the Deputy Chief Justice are two of the seven judges who sit on the 
Supreme Court.  It is likely that the drafters of the Constitution of 2010 
probably settled on seven judges to represent the provinces in Kenya, 
which at the time of drafting the Constitution were the administrative 
units within the executive branch of government. There were eight 
provinces including Nairobi.  It is my position that the composition of 
the Supreme Court appointments is meant to represent the seven 
provinces excluding Nairobi. 
This is not a novel phenomenon. The Canadian Supreme Court faced a 
similar challenge in appointing judges from Quebec.354  However, 
significant differences exist in Canada, namely that Supreme Court 
appointments are made by the Prime Minister and legislation mandates 
that three of the nine judges must come from Quebec. The similarity 
between Kenya and Quebec is that the composition of the Supreme Court 
was guided by the need to reflect the population. One way the JSC can 
make its decisions transparent for Supreme Court appointments is to 
lobby for a Supreme Court bill that includes a clause requiring that 
appointments reflect the general population as much as possible. 
Another principle for the JSC to acknowledge is that judicial councils are 
not immune from controversy. No matter how transparent the process is 
and despite the fact that the driving force for the JSC will always be to 
select judicial officers on merit, the JSC will face vitriolic criticism. This 
is likely to take place in the selection of judges to the High Court, Court 
of Appeal, and particularly the Supreme Court, where selection will 
inevitably be influenced by politics.355 
Furthermore, judicial members of the JSC should not have other 
additional arduous responsibilities in addition to the responsibility of 
sitting on the JSC. This is regardless of their ability to balance their work 
with other obligations. Sitting on the council is a demanding task, as 
additional responsibilities will be assigned by virtue of the position in 
  
 354. F.L. Morton, Judicial Appoints In Post-Charter Canada: A System In Transition, in 
APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER 56, 58 (Malleson & Russell eds., 2006); See 
also Eli M. Salzberger, Judicial Appointments and Promotions in Israel: Constitution, Law and 
Politics, in APPOINTING JUDGES IN AN AGE OF JUDICIAL POWER 241-259 (Malleson & Russell eds. 
2006) (positing that the political context of the country has a bearing on Supreme Court 
appointments). 
 355. Du Bois, supra note # 11, at 292. 
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addition to handling normal judicial duties. For example, one of the 
commissioners in the current JSC is also the head of a division. He 
assumed the head of division role after being elected as commissioner. 
Although his ability to work as a commissioner has not been 
compromised by his responsibility as head of a division, the workload of 
both positions is too much for one individual. Given the JSC’s workload 
in its first year in addition to the fact that commissioners review judicial 
applications, shortlist candidates, conduct candidate interviews, and meet 
to deliberate before making their final decision, the representatives of the 
JSC should have fairly flexible schedules to allow them to focus solely 
on the JSC. Therefore, their role should be limited to commissioner 
without outside judicial responsibilities. 
The same applies to JSC commissioners who are elected as 
representatives of LSK. However, their role is slightly more complicated 
because LSK members elect them. I have already addressed the 
complications that may arise from these lawyers who are representatives 
if the member of the LSK is on the JSC. The complications arise because 
these lawyers who sit on the JSC appear before judicial officers who 
have matters pending before the JSC, whether in the form of applications 
for promotions, appointment as a judge, or disciplinary issues. It is more 
complicated, because judicial officers may perceive prejudice or bias that 
their matters coming before the JSC, will be handled by the JSC 
commissioner who is a lawyer based on interactions in court.   
In the JSC, one of the lawyers (an LSK representative) publishes an 
authoritative law magazine monthly. A recent edition featured an article, 
commentary, and analysis on the conduct of one senior judicial officer. 
While freedom of speech is a fundamental right recognized in the 
Kenyan Constitution, the public holds a commissioner to a higher 
standard. Allowing such a publication is distasteful. He is at liberty to 
express his views just like all Kenyans, but because he sits on the JSC, he 
must be sensitive to the fact that he may be seen to be presenting JSC 
views and not merely his own. The public will perceive bias in the article 
despite the fact that the article was published after the judicial officer 
was suspended from office. The caution is that the JSC collectively must 
be careful what message it sends to the public about its treatment of 
judicial officers. The public takes their cue from commissioners. They 
are likely to esteem or degrade judicial officers based on the methods 
they see being used to appoint (and discipline) judicial officers. Thus far 
the JSC has handled all situations commendably.  
In the future, the JSC will need a strengthened administrative unit to 
assist it in its work. This is a direct consequence of the growth of the 
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judiciary. When the post-2010 JSC started its work in February 2011, the 
Supreme Court existed only on paper. However, it is now staffed with 
judges, and the number of judges on the Court of Appeal has doubled, 
and the number of High Court judges has increased by almost fifty 
percent. Additionally, the number of magistrates is set to increase by 
thirty percent. The prescribed number of judges to sit on the High Court 
is seventy, but an amendment was passed recently to increase this 
number to 150 judges and to increase the Court of Appeal judges to 
thirty.356 The eleven commissioners will be overwhelmed if they have to 
process these files.  Consequently, part of their long-term plan should 
include strengthening the JSC’s administrative arm. 
Another reason the JSC needs a strengthened administrative arm is to 
conduct periodic assessments (for example every seven years) of judicial 
officers.  It is important to do this to ascertain the training needs of 
judicial officers, as well as to achieve standards of ethics and integrity. 
Currently the Kenyan judiciary is going through a vetting process that 
aims to thoroughly scrutinize judges and magistrates currently on the 
bench and assess their suitability to continue holding office. This is the 
first time the vetting process is taking place with involvement from 
judicial officers. A board that has already been selected will examine the 
records of judges and magistrates who were in office when the 
Constitution was promulgated on August 27, 2010. It will assess among 
other qualities, the judge’s character, quality of judgments, and any 
complaints lodged against them. When the process is complete, those 
found suitable to serve will continue to their position. However, it is my 
view that the process of assessing judicial officers should be periodic and 
take place once every five years. The lag period is long because I take 
into account the fact that appointment methods have changed. 
Additionally, the public is now emboldened to make complaints to the 
JSC when faced with difficult judicial officers.  
The media has played a major role in projecting the image of the JSC in 
its crusade to restore the judiciary and make justice the ‘shield and 
defender’ in the words of the Kenyan national anthem.357 The media has 
also helped to promote transparency in judicial appointments by 
broadcasting interviews of candidates for judgeship in real-time across 
Kenya. The print media has provided insightful background for the 
  
 356. See generally the State of Judiciary Address, October 2012 by Chief Justice Dr. Willy 
Mutunga available at http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/?articleID=2000068789&story_title=state-of-
the-judiciary-report-2011-2012&pageNo=3.   
 357. The line in the anthem is “Justice be our shield and defender.”  Words of the full anthem in 
English and Swahili are available at http://www.kenya-travel-packages.com/kenya-national-
anthem.html.  
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public about the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice, since little was 
publicly known about the candidates.  This was a refreshing and bold 
move since it had never been done in Kenya’s history and was 
particularly useful for the public to get to know those who applied to 
these posts.  The JSC should develop a policy on its relations with the 
media, including information commissioners can and cannot divulge 
from their meetings. The present commissioners are setting the pace for 
the conduct of other commissioners who will replace them in future. It 
will be good for their successors to find a policy document that guides 
them in their conduct because they will be new to the post. It will also 
make the learning curve smoother for successive commissioners.  
Additionally, the JSC will have to grapple with the issue of seniority. 
This particularly affects judicial officers who have served in the judiciary 
for more than five years. The judicial culture has decided promotions and 
status based on the number of years served. Thus, career judicial officers 
have been held with high prestige.  It was the prevailing culture that 
appointment to become a judge or elevation to the Court of Appeal was 
based on seniority. This is not a feature unique to the Kenyan judiciary. 
It happened in Australia in 1966 with the establishment of the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal, which replaced the former court and changed the 
seniority of judges within the court structure. This caused discomfort 
among some of the more senior judges.358 
Culture takes time to change.359 There is not much action the JSC 
commissioners can take in addressing the issue of seniority, apart from 
recognizing that it exists in the psyche of many judicial officers who 
have served for a long time. Many of them are motivated, work hard, 
have made difficult personal sacrifices, and have given their best to the 
judiciary.360 In an attempt to focus on merit, the JSC should not discount 
  
 358. See generally Hon. J. Michael Kirby, Judicial Supersession: The Controversial 
Establishment of the New South Wales Court of Appeal, 30 SYDNEY L. REV. 177 (2008). (“The 
creation of the new Court of Appeal for New South Wales, with effect from 1 January 1966, and the 
consequent passing over of the commissioned judges of the Supreme Court of the State who were 
not appointed to the new appellate court, produced sharp feelings of resentment amongst many of 
those judges. Suddenly and unexpectedly their seniority within the Supreme Court was disturbed, 
affecting the work they did and perceptions of their status in the legal profession and the 
community.”). 
 359. Id. at page 177. (“In our legal tradition, such disturbance of seniority amongst the judges 
(“supersession”) other than by appointment of a judge to the separate office of the Chief Justice, is a 
relatively rare and constitutional step. Citizens and some lawyers may wonder what all the fuss is 
about. However, the basic reason for the concern has to do with the independence of courts, the 
integrity of their internal arrangements affecting already appointed judges and the convention that 
those arrangements will normally be left to the courts themselves, once their members are 
commissioned.”). 
 360. Id. at page 183. (“Many of those judges superseded would have considered that they had 
been demoted in rank in a very public way.  This destabilized the manifest independence of the 
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these factors. Indeed the challenge to the JSC is to see how to ensure that 
these judges and magistrates who were dependent on seniority for 
promotion, remain motivated and apply for vacancies when they arise 
and fit the description. 
Does the JSC have an appeal process for a candidate dissatisfied with the 
outcome, and if so, is the process known to candidates? Are there clear 
grounds in which one can appeal or is it based on the subjective 
understanding of the candidate? The Judicial Service Act of 2011, which 
regulates the JSC, does not have any procedure in place for a candidate 
to appeal. In the Kenyan system of justice, the JSC is subordinate to the 
High Court, and therefore a candidate who feels mistreated has the 
option to appeal to the High Court. However, this takes time and can 
cripple the work of the JSC if for example, the candidate was to seek an 
injunction against the JSC and it was granted. However, the JSC should 
consider having regulations that address a candidate’s dissatisfaction 
internally before going to the High Court because it is more cost 
effective, attracts less publicity, and models that justice starts within the 
judiciary.  
Training council members is a practice that the JSC should incorporate 
as one of its core activities to be carried out in a year. A study conducted 
by USAID in April 2004 draws on lessons from judicial councils in 
Europe and Latin American and recommends several best practices, one 
of which is training council members.361  The study explains that the 
purpose of the training is to help council members carry out their roles 
better and “reduce their vulnerability to pressure.”362 Training is 
absolutely necessary since JSC Commissioners are from different 
backgrounds, and furthermore, this may be their first time sitting in such 
a high position.  
Another recommendation the USAID study mentioned is for judicial 
councils to identify weak spots, referred to as “sources of 
interference.”363 One of these sources, covered quite extensively in other 
chapters of the study is political interference. The JSC needs to identify 
  
State’s highest judges. It was therefore not a trivial or purely personal affair. Unless judges are 
vigilant in cases of such disturbance, the government and Parliament might use such a precedent to 
diminish Supreme Court judges to mere public servants rather than constitutional office holders with 
vital duties as guardians of the public against the misuse of government power.”). 
 361. See Violaine Autheman & Sandra Elena, Global Best Practices: Judicial Councils: 
Lessons Learned from Europe and Latin America, IFES RULE OF LAW WHITE PAPER SERIES (April 
2004), available at http://www.ifes.org/Content/Publications/White-Papers/2004/Global-Best-
Practices-Judicial-Councils-Lessons-Learned-from-Europe-and-Latin-America.aspx. 
 362. Id. at 17. 
 363. Id. 
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its areas of weakness and protect itself from these influences. 
Consequently, JSC commissioners should strive to avoid all forms of 
affiliation with political parties in Kenya. This is possible since the 
political scene in Kenya is different from the United States or England 
and Wales, where there are two main parties and a judge is labeled either 
conservative or progressive. Behind closed doors, it is advisable for the 
JSC to have candid discussions about certain political classes lobbying 
the JSC in hopes that it will make decisions in favor of certain 
candidates. The JSC should publicly reiterate the objective basis by 
which it makes decisions as a way of sending a subtle message to the 
ruling political class that it will not tolerate political lobbying. One 
consequence of this will be that the public becomes aware that the 
political class has no control over the JSC (or its choices) and will speak 
out when decisions are made contrary to procedure. This is precisely 
what happened in January 2011 after President Kibaki attempted to 
appoint a Chief Justice unilaterally without participation from the JSC. 
Kenyans resoundingly rejected his choice for not following the process 
set out in the Kenya Constitution of 2010 and the JSC embarked on its 
first litmus test of finding a Chief Justice.364 It successfully passed this 
test and in doing so raised the bar for other government institutions in the 
manner of making appointments. 
Yet another recommendation the JSC may want to implement from the 
USAID study on judicial councils in Europe and Latin America is 
developing its relationship with civil society.365 My recommendation is 
that the JSC should develop strategic partnerships with different sectors 
of society including academics and the media as already mentioned 
earlier in this chapter.366 These collaborations are good for the JSC 
because they keep communication channels between the JSC and other 
parts of society open.  
The JSC ought to aim as much as possible to keep its internal 
disagreements away from the limelight and hidden from media attention. 
  
 364. See Michael Gichuki, JSC Rejects Kibaki’s List Of Nominees, KBC NEWS, January 31 
2011, available at http://www.kbc.co.ke/news.asp?nid=68674 (showing the JSC’s disapproval); See 
also Ken Kahugu, Court Says Kibaki Nominees Illegal, THE DAILY NATION, February 4, 2011, 
available at http://thedailynation.blogspot.com/2011/02/court-says-kibaki-nominees-illegal.html; 
See generally Marende Rejects Kibaki’s Nomination, KATIBA SASA CAMPAIGN!, 
http://www.katibasasa.org/2011/02/18/marende-rejects-kibakis-nominations/ (for a view from the 
Parliament’s reaction to Kibaki’s actions); See also Henry Wanyama, Civil Society Group Lauds 
Kibaki, THE STAR NEWSPAPER, February 28, 2011, available at http://www.the-
star.co.ke/national/national/15846-civil-society-lobby-group-lauds-kibaki (for civil society’s 
response to Kibaki withdrawing the names). 
 365. Autheman & Elena, supra note 361, at 17. 
 366. See supra at pg. 64.  
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This is not to say the JSC should pretend, but public confidence of its 
ability to select judges is based upon the cohesiveness of the JSC. The 
more united the JSC projects to the public, the greater the esteem the 
public will have for JSC commissioners. This reflects back to rising 
public trust in judges and magistrates and ultimately, the judiciary.  
The JSC may opt for an alternative route instead of keeping its 
deliberations from the limelight. A recent report on judicial commissions 
in the United States posits, “Although written voting procedures can 
significantly enhance the legitimacy and fairness of the process, a 
number of commissions have been known to operate on the basis of 
consensus or other ad-hoc decision making-making procedures.”367  
Irrespective of the method it chooses, the goal of the JSC’s deliberation 
and voting procedures should be “to enhance the integrity of the process, 
avoid the appearance of favoritism or ‘panel-stacking’ and help ensure 
that the public, the applicants, and the governor [the appointing 
authority] can feel secure in the knowledge that the process functions to 
staff the court with the best qualified judges.”368 
Establishing a plan for the judiciary to ensure that it is ready for the 
demands of the twenty-first century, as well as Kenya’s growing 
population is a crucial function of the JSC. This will be unchartered 
water for the new judiciary because the pre-2010 JSC did not have this 
function, since it was the judiciary’s role to formulate two strategic 
plans. However, it may be worthwhile to have the JSC work together 
with the judiciary to come up with the next strategic plan. The JSC will 
have an advantage in suggesting direction for the judiciary while judges 
and magistrates can provide input with a view from the ground. 
It would also be worthwhile for the JSC to have a report prepared by a 
local consultant on the assessment of the JSC’s work and its impact on 
the judiciary every ten years. This report would provide an objective 
view of the work carried out by the JSC, the challenges it has faced, and 
recommendations on how to overcome these hurdles. The report would 
be a public document available as a reference book for the JSC but also 
for anyone interested in the progress and work of the JSC. 
With regard to training of judges and magistrates, the JSC is mandated 
under Article 172 (1)(d) of the Kenya Constitution 2010 to devise 
  
 367. Rachael Paine Caufield, Inside Merit Selection-A National Survey of Judicial Nominating 
Commissions, AMERICAN JUDICATURE SOCIETY 33 (2012), available at 
http://www.judicialselection.us/uploads/documents/JNC_Survey_ReportFINAL3_92E04A2F04E65.
pdf.  
 368. Id. 
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training programs. I would add that the JSC should also craft a policy on 
how to handle the nomination or appointment of a sitting judge or 
magistrate to an international court, commission, or tribunal while still 
serving as a Kenyan judicial officer. 
As a practical matter and step toward independence, the JSC should have 
a separate postal address from the Kenyan judiciary. Since the secretary 
to the JSC is also the chief registrar of the courts it may, for logistical 
purposes, be easier to have the mail processed using one address. But if 
the eventual aim of the JSC is independence then the Siamese 
relationship between the judiciary and the JSC, which has existed ever 
since Kenya’s independence, must be brought to an end. 
VII. CONCLUSION  
Judicial councils are one method of selecting judges to serve in a 
country. For both Kenya and England, this system has increased the 
public’s confidence in the judicial system. A judicial council existed in 
Kenya prior to 2010, but was an extension of the executive branch of 
government since most of the members in the pre-2010 JSC were 
residential appointments. In England and Wales, it is a new phenomenon 
introduced by the Constitutional Reform Act of 2005.  
Both judicial councils are recommending bodies. They advertise and 
interview candidates before coming up with a list of who, in their view, 
should be appointed to the bench.  In England and Wales, the Lord 
Chancellor appoints judges based on recommendations from the JAC. In 
both Kenyan and English judicial councils, judges are the minority and 
there is no representation from the legislature on the judicial council. 
Both judicial councils have a good representation of men and women. 
The chairperson of the JAC is a layperson while the chairperson of the 
JSC is the Chief Justice. The JAC is made up of 15 members while the 
JSC has 12 members, though the secretary of the JSC has no voting 
rights. With the exception of judges and lawyers, all members of the JAC 
apply for their positions through a competitive process. The JSC 
commissioners sit part-time.  
In both Kenya and England and Wales, there are visible differences of 
candidates selected to join the bench in the form of increased diversity. 
Most notably there are more women judges, which sends a positive 
message to society on the role of women, particularly that women can be 
leaders and hold senior posts in an institution.  In Kenyan society, this is 
a paradigm shift. There are also more candidates applying outside the 
traditional pool of applicants.  In the case of Kenya, more lawyers from 
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outside the three major cities are applying, and in the case of England 
and Wales, more women, solicitors, disabled, and minority candidates 
are applying. 
Judicial councils have their faults too. They may be covertly hijacked for 
political purposes. No matter how much judicial councils try to reach a 
just recommendation, they are not immune from criticism about 
candidates they present for appointment. Judicial councils may also 
suffer from internal wrangling and this can have a negative impact on the 
selection process. They are not a workable solution for every jurisdiction, 
for example Bolivia. Judicial councils do not produce the same results of 
accountability and independence in every jurisdiction. 
The most important part of judicial councils is their composition. When 
there is transparency about how commissioners are selected, this 
translates into confidence from the public that judicial councils will make 
the best selection. The selection of commissioners also provides a shield 
from political influence to some extent, but in some instances, 
particularly in the selection of judges for the the final appellate court in 
the land, judicial councils may make selections taking political impact 
into account on who shall sit as judge in the highest court of the land. 
The post-2010 JSC is not a transplant of the JAC in England and Wales. 
Rather it was born out of the need to limit the reach of the executive 
branch of government on the judiciary. The reform in the JSC and 
ultimately in the appointment of judges and magistrates was driven by 
the need to strengthen the judiciary and change the perception that judges 
are beholden to do the will of the executive at all times.  In England and 
Wales, the reform was brought about because of the need to modernize 
the way judges were appointed to the bench due to the expanding 
influence of decisions from the European Court of Human Rights. There 
was also a measure of dissatisfaction with the appointment system of 
judges through recommendations of the Lord Chancellor which led to the 
bench being comprised of elite, male, and white judges. 
The JAC has been operational for more than five years while the JSC in 
Kenya is only a year old. It is my hope that the recommendations in this 
article will enhance the operations not only of the JSC, but of any other 
judicial council that wants to achieve independence and accountability in 
its system of judicial appointments.  
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